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Competitive information disclosure by multiple senders

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Shih-Tang Su & Vijay G. Subramanian, 2022. "Order of Commitments in Bayesian Persuasion with Partial-informed Senders," Papers 2202.06479, arXiv.org.
  2. Quan Li & Kang Rong, 2024. "Full disclosure in competitive Bayesian persuasion," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 53(2), pages 525-545, June.
  3. Christian Ewerhart, 2022. "Diagonal payoff security and equilibrium existence in quasi-symmetric discontinuous games," ECON - Working Papers 414, Department of Economics - University of Zurich, revised Aug 2022.
  4. Kun Zhang, 2025. "Uncharted Waters: Selling a New Product Robustly," Papers 2508.04134, arXiv.org.
  5. Kemal Kivanc Akoz & Arseniy Samsonov, 2023. "Bargaining over information structures," Discussion Papers 2301, Budapest University of Technology and Economics, Quantitative Social and Management Sciences.
  6. Alon, Shiri & Auster, Sarah & Gayer, Gabi & Minardi, Stefania, 2023. "Persuasion with Limited Data: A Case-Based Approach," CEPR Discussion Papers 18428, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  7. Renou, Ludovic & Atakan, Alp & Ekmekci, Mehmet, 2021. "Cross-verification and Persuasive Cheap Talk," CEPR Discussion Papers 16801, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  8. He, Wei & Li, Jiangtao, 2023. "Competitive information disclosure in random search markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 140(C), pages 132-153.
  9. Atakan, Alp & Ekmekci, Mehmet & Renou, Ludovic, 2024. "Cross-verification and persuasive cheap talk," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 222(C).
  10. Whitmeyer, Mark, 2023. "Submission costs in risk-taking contests," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 142(C), pages 101-112.
  11. Oleg Muratov, 2023. "Entrepreneur–Investor Information Design," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 64(4), pages 1431-1467, November.
  12. Natalie Collina & Surbhi Goel & Aaron Roth & Emily Ryu & Mirah Shi, 2025. "Emergent Alignment via Competition," Papers 2509.15090, arXiv.org.
  13. Piotr Dworczak & Alessandro Pavan, 2022. "Preparing for the Worst but Hoping for the Best: Robust (Bayesian) Persuasion," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 90(5), pages 2017-2051, September.
  14. Frédéric Koessler & Marie Laclau & Jerôme Renault & Tristan Tomala, 2022. "Long information design," Post-Print hal-03700394, HAL.
  15. Asriyan, Vladimir & Foarta, Dana & Vanasco, Victoria, 2018. "Strategic Complexity When Seeking Approval," Research Papers 3615, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
  16. Vladimir Asriyan & Dana Foarta & Victoria Vanasco, 2023. "The Good, the Bad, and the Complex: Product Design with Imperfect Information," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 15(2), pages 187-226, May.
  17. Aköz, Kemal Kıvanç & Samsonov, Arseniy, 2025. "Information agreements," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 229(C).
  18. Jacopo Bizzotto & Adrien Vigier, 2021. "Can a better informed listener be easier to persuade?," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 72(3), pages 705-721, October.
  19. Kim, Kyungmin & Koh, Youngwoo, 2022. "Auctions with flexible information acquisition," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 133(C), pages 256-281.
  20. Pak Hung Au & Mark Whitmeyer, 2021. "Attraction Versus Persuasion," HKUST CEP Working Papers Series 202102, HKUST Center for Economic Policy.
  21. Alvin Ang & Ser Percival Pena-Reyes, 2020. "Aid Distribution During the COVID-19 Crisis," Department of Economics, Ateneo de Manila University, Working Paper Series 202006, Department of Economics, Ateneo de Manila University.
  22. Eitan Sapiro-Gheiler, 2024. "Persuasion with ambiguous receiver preferences," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 77(4), pages 1173-1218, June.
  23. Ju Hu & Xi Weng, 2021. "Robust persuasion of a privately informed receiver," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 72(3), pages 909-953, October.
  24. Koessler, Frederic & Laclau, Marie & Renault, Jérôme & Tomala, Tristan, 2022. "Long information design," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 17(2), May.
  25. Dongjin Hwang & Ilwoo Hwang, 2025. "Competitive Information Disclosure with Heterogeneous Consumer Search," Papers 2504.04659, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2025.
  26. Ronen Gradwohl & Niklas Hahn & Martin Hoefer & Rann Smorodinsky, 2020. "Reaping the Informational Surplus in Bayesian Persuasion," Papers 2006.02048, arXiv.org.
  27. Teddy Mekonnen & Bobak Pakzad-Hurson, 2024. "Competition, Persuasion, and Search," Papers 2411.11183, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2025.
  28. Oleg Muratov, 2025. "Mapping an information design game into an all-pay auction," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 29(3), pages 513-543, September.
  29. Frédéric Koessler & Marie Laclau & Tristan Tomala, 2022. "Interactive Information Design," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 47(1), pages 153-175, February.
  30. Mustafa Dogan & Ju Hu, 2022. "Consumer search and optimal information," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 53(2), pages 386-403, June.
  31. Raphael Boleslavsky & Silvana Krasteva, 2025. "Limits of Disclosure in Search Markets," Papers 2506.06319, arXiv.org, revised Jun 2025.
  32. Mark Whitmeyer, 2021. "Submission Fees in Risk-Taking Contests," Papers 2108.13506, arXiv.org.
  33. Whitmeyer, Joseph & Whitmeyer, Mark, 2021. "Mixtures of mean-preserving contractions," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(C).
  34. Raphael Boleslavsky & Bruce Carlin & Christopher Cotton, 2021. "A Model of Challenge Funds: How Funding Availability and Selection Rigor Affect Project Quality," Working Paper 1470, Economics Department, Queen's University.
  35. Wu, Wenhao, 2023. "Sequential Bayesian persuasion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 214(C).
  36. Niloufar Mirzavand Boroujeni & Krishnamurthy Iyer & William L. Cooper, 2025. "Decentralized Signaling Mechanisms," Papers 2504.14163, arXiv.org.
  37. Frédéric Koessler & Marie Laclau & Jerôme Renault & Tristan Tomala, 2022. "Long information design," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) hal-03700394, HAL.
  38. Wu, Wenhao & Ye, Bohan, 2023. "Competition in persuasion: An experiment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 138(C), pages 72-89.
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