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The non-existence of pairwise-proof equilibrium

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Chrysovalantou Milliou, 2014. "Location for Foreign Direct Investment in Vertically Related Markets," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 22(2), pages 326-341, May.
  2. Emanuele Bacchiega & Olivier Bonroy & Emmanuel Petrakis, 2018. "Contract contingency in vertically related markets," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 27(4), pages 772-791, October.
  3. Corts, Kenneth S. & Neher, Darwin V., 2003. "Credible delegation," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 47(3), pages 395-407, June.
  4. Rey, Patrick & Salant, David, 2012. "Abuse of dominance and licensing of intellectual property," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 30(6), pages 518-527.
  5. Alipranti, Maria & Milliou, Chrysovalantou & Petrakis, Emmanuel, 2015. "On vertical relations and the timing of technology adoption," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 117-129.
  6. Yongmin Chen & Michael H. Riordan, 2007. "Vertical integration, exclusive dealing, and expost cartelization," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 38(1), pages 1-21, March.
  7. Alipranti, Maria & Petrakis, Emmanuel & Skartados, Panagiotis, 2022. "On the pro-competitive effects of passive partial backward ownership," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 213(C).
  8. Vanessa von Schlippenbach & Isabel Teichmann, 2012. "The Strategic Use of Private Quality Standards in Food Supply Chains," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 94(5), pages 1189-1201.
  9. Isabel Teichmann & Vanessa von Schlippenbach, 2014. "Collusive Effects of a Monopolist's Use of an Intermediary to Deliver to Retailers," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 1440, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
  10. Emmanuel Petrakis & Panagiotis Skartados, 2022. "First-mover advantage reversals under passive cross forward ownership in vertically related markets," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 10(2), pages 303-311, October.
  11. Stéphane Caprice, 2005. "Incentive to encourage downstream competition under bilateral oligopoly [[Incitation d'une firme amont à favoriser la concurrence en aval dans le cadre d'un oligopole bilatéral]]," Post-Print hal-02676111, HAL.
  12. Chrysovalantou Milliou & Apostolis Pavlou, 2020. "Foreign direct investment in vertically related markets," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 53(1), pages 284-320, February.
  13. Stephane Caprice, 2005. "Incentive to encourage downstream competition under bilateral oligopoly," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 12(9), pages 1-5.
  14. Milliou, Chrysovalantou & Petrakis, Emmanuel, 2007. "Upstream horizontal mergers, vertical contracts, and bargaining," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 25(5), pages 963-987, October.
  15. Bakaouka, Elpiniki & Milliou, Chrysovalantou, 2018. "Vertical licensing, input pricing, and entry," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 66-96.
  16. Maria Alipranti & Chrysovalantou Miliou & Emmanuel Petrakis, 2014. "On Vertical Relations and Technology Adoption Timing," Working Papers 1502, University of Crete, Department of Economics.
  17. Lømo, Teis Lunde, 2015. "Risk sharing mitigates opportunism in vertical contracting," Working Papers in Economics 10/15, University of Bergen, Department of Economics.
  18. Alipranti, Maria & Petrakis, Emmanuel, 2020. "Fixed fee discounts and Bertrand competition in vertically related markets," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 19-26.
  19. Catherine C. Fontenay & Joshua S. Gans, 2014. "Bilateral Bargaining with Externalities," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 62(4), pages 756-788, December.
  20. Alipranti, Maria & Milliou, Chrysovalantou & Petrakis, Emmanuel, 2014. "Price vs. quantity competition in a vertically related market," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 124(1), pages 122-126.
  21. Petrakis, Emmanuel & Skartados, Panagiotis, 2022. "Disclosure regime of contract terms and bargaining in vertical markets," UC3M Working papers. Economics 34144, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
  22. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:12:y:2005:i:9:p:1-5 is not listed on IDEAS
  23. Chrysovalantou Miliou & Emmanuel Petrakis, 2015. "Vertical Integration, Knowledge Disclosure and Decreasing Rival's Cost," Working Papers 1507, University of Crete, Department of Economics.
  24. Milliou, Chrysovalantou & Petrakis, Emmanuel, 2012. "Vertical integration, knowledge disclosure and decreasing rival's cost," UC3M Working papers. Economics we1213, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
  25. Emmanuel Petrakis & Panagiotis Skartados, 2018. "Strategic Profit–Sharing in a Unionized Differentiated Goods Duopoly," Working Papers 1801, University of Crete, Department of Economics.
  26. Bagwell, Kyle & Staiger, Robert W. & Yurukoglu, Ali, 2020. "“Nash-in-Nash” tariff bargaining," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 122(C).
  27. Papadopoulos, Konstantinos G. & Petrakis, Emmanuel & Skartados, Panagiotis, 2021. "The ambiguous competitive effects of passive partial forward integration," UC3M Working papers. Economics 33354, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
  28. Yusuke Ikuta, 2017. "Linear Supply Function Competition in A Vertically Related Market," International Journal of Economic Policy Studies, Springer, vol. 12(1), pages 1-22, January.
  29. Ioannis Pinopoulos, 2017. "Input price discrimination, two-part tariff contracts and bargaining," Discussion Paper Series 2017_01, Department of Economics, University of Macedonia, revised Jan 2017.
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