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Fear of Miscoordination and the Robustness of Cooperation in Dynamic Global Games With Exit

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  1. , L., 2013. "Fragility of reputation and clustering of risk-taking," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 8(3), September.
  2. David M. Frankel, 2010. "Rent Seeking and Economic Fragility," Levine's Bibliography 661465000000000159, UCLA Department of Economics.
  3. Mathevet, Laurent & Steiner, Jakub, 2013. "Tractable dynamic global games and applications," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(6), pages 2583-2619.
  4. Roweno J. R. K. Heijmans, 2023. "Unraveling Coordination Problems," Papers 2307.08557, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2023.
  5. Christopher Bidner & Ken Jackson, 2011. "Trust and Vulnerability," Discussion Papers 2012-09, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
  6. Kováč, Eugen & Steiner, Jakub, 2013. "Reversibility in dynamic coordination problems," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 298-320.
  7. Bernardo Guimaraes & Luis Araujo, 2012. "The effect of options on coordination," 2012 Meeting Papers 474, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  8. Laurent Mathevet & Jakub Steiner, 2012. "Sand in the Wheels: A Dynamic Global-Game Approach," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp459, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
  9. Du, Chunpeng & Guo, Keyu & Lu, Yikang & Jin, Haoyu & Shi, Lei, 2023. "Aspiration driven exit-option resolves social dilemmas in the network," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 438(C).
  10. , & ,, 2013. "Selection-free predictions in global games with endogenous information and multiple equilibria," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 8(3), September.
  11. Balbus, Łukasz & Reffett, Kevin & Woźny, Łukasz, 2018. "On uniqueness of time-consistent Markov policies for quasi-hyperbolic consumers under uncertainty," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 176(C), pages 293-310.
  12. Daron Acemoglu & Georgy Egorov & Konstantin Sonin, 2015. "Political Economy in a Changing World," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 123(5), pages 1038-1086.
  13. Matthew Embrey & Friederike Mengel & Ronald Peeters, 2019. "Strategy revision opportunities and collusion," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 22(4), pages 834-856, December.
  14. Araujo, Luis & Guimaraes, Bernardo, 2015. "Intertemporal coordination with delay options," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 793-810.
  15. Tsoy, Anton, 2018. "Alternating-offer bargaining with the global games information structure," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 13(2), May.
  16. David McAdams, 2011. "Performance and Turnover in a Stochastic Partnership," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 3(4), pages 107-142, November.
  17. Bernardo Guimaraes & Caio Machado & Ana E. Pereira, 2020. "Dynamic coordination with timing frictions: Theory and applications," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 22(3), pages 656-697, June.
  18. Frankel, David M., 2017. "Efficient ex-ante stabilization of firms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 170(C), pages 112-144.
  19. Łukasz Balbus & Kevin Reffett & Łukasz Woźny, 2013. "Markov Stationary Equilibria in Stochastic Supermodular Games with Imperfect Private and Public Information," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 3(2), pages 187-206, June.
  20. Matthew Embrey & Friederike Mengel & Ronald Peeters, 2016. "Strategy Revision Opportunities and Collusion," Working Paper Series 8716, Department of Economics, University of Sussex.
  21. Zhen Zhou & Deepal Basak, 2015. "Diffusing Coordination Risk," 2015 Meeting Papers 1350, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  22. Sareh Vosooghi, 2019. "Panic-Based Overfishing in Transboundary Fisheries," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 73(4), pages 1287-1313, August.
  23. Angeletos, G.-M. & Lian, C., 2016. "Incomplete Information in Macroeconomics," Handbook of Macroeconomics, in: J. B. Taylor & Harald Uhlig (ed.), Handbook of Macroeconomics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 0, pages 1065-1240, Elsevier.
  24. Dong Beom Choi, 2014. "Heterogeneity and Stability: Bolster the Strong, Not the Weak," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 27(6), pages 1830-1867.
  25. Pathikrit Basu & Kalyan Chatterjee & Tetsuya Hoshino & Omer Tamuz, 2018. "Repeated Coordination with Private Learning," Papers 1809.00051, arXiv.org.
  26. Frankel, David M., 2015. "Insuring Customers of a Unionized Firm Against Loss of Network Benefits," Staff General Research Papers Archive 38580, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  27. Fischer, Gregory, 2011. "Contract structure, risk sharing and investment choice," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 41890, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  28. Sylvain Chassang & Gerard Padró I Miquel, 2010. "Conflict and Deterrence Under Strategic Risk," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 125(4), pages 1821-1858.
  29. George-Marios Angeletos & Chen Lian, 2016. "Incomplete Information in Macroeconomics: Accommodating Frictions in Coordination," NBER Working Papers 22297, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  30. Basu, Pathikrit & Chatterjee, Kalyan & Hoshino, Tetsuya & Tamuz, Omer, 2020. "Repeated coordination with private learning," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 190(C).
  31. Arvaniti, Maria & Krishnamurthy, Chandra Kiran B. & Crépin, Anne-Sophie, 2023. "Time-consistent renewable resource management with present bias and regime shifts," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 207(C), pages 479-495.
  32. Aghadadashli, Hamid, 2020. "Let’s Collude," CEPR Discussion Papers 15241, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  33. Frankel, David M., 2014. "Optimal Insurance for Small Stakeholders," Staff General Research Papers Archive 37551, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  34. Heijmans, Roweno J.R.K., 2023. "Unraveling Coordination Problems," Discussion Papers 2023/20, Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Business and Management Science.
  35. Montizaan Raymond & Cörvers Frank & Grip Andries de & Dohmen Thomas, 2012. "Negative Reciprocity and retrenched pension rights," Research Memorandum 053, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
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