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Citations for "Toward a Strategic Foundation for Rational Expectations Equilibrium"

by Philip J Reny & Motty Perry

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  1. Michael Ostrovsky, 2012. "Information Aggregation in Dynamic Markets With Strategic Traders," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 80(6), pages 2595-2647, November.
  2. Vives, Xavier, 2011. "A large-market rational expectations equilibrium model," IESE Research Papers D/924, IESE Business School.
  3. Gresik, Thomas A., 2011. "The effects of statistically dependent values on equilibrium strategies of bilateral k-double auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 139-148, May.
  4. Alexander Kovalenkov & Xavier Vives, 2008. "Competitive Rational Expectations Equilibria without Apology," CESifo Working Paper Series 2446, CESifo Group Munich.
  5. Duffie, Darrell & Malamud, Semyon & Manso, Gustavo, 2009. "The Relative Contributions of Private Information Sharing and Public Information Releases to Information Aggregation," Research Papers 2023, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
  6. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2007. "Detail-Free Mechanism Design in Twice Iterative Dominance: Large Economies," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-519, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
  7. García, Diego & Urošević, Branko, 2013. "Noise and aggregation of information in large markets," Journal of Financial Markets, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 526-549.
  8. Darrell DUFFIE & Semyon MALAMUD & Gustavo MANSO, 2010. "Information Percolation in Segmented Markets," Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper Series 10-09, Swiss Finance Institute.
  9. Satterthwaite, Mark & Shneyerov, Artyom, 2008. "Convergence to perfect competition of a dynamic matching and bargaining market with two-sided incomplete information and exogenous exit rate," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 435-467, July.
  10. Green, Edward J. & Zhou, Ruilin, 2010. "Perfectly competitive bilateral exchange without discounting," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 121-131, March.
  11. Skreta, Vasiliki & Veldkamp, Laura, 2009. "Ratings shopping and asset complexity: A theory of ratings inflation," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(5), pages 678-695, July.
  12. Artyom Shneyerov & Adam Chi Leung Won, 2008. "The Rate of Convergence to Perfect Competition of Matching and Bargaining Mechanisms," Discussion Papers 1467, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  13. Araujo, Aloisio & de Castro, Luciano I., 2009. "Pure strategy equilibria of single and double auctions with interdependent values," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 65(1), pages 25-48, January.
  14. Hu, Tai-Wei & Wallace, Neil, 2016. "Information aggregation in a large multi-stage market game," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 161(C), pages 103-144.
  15. Bodoh-Creed, Aaron, 2013. "Efficiency and information aggregation in large uniform-price auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(6), pages 2436-2466.
  16. Duffie, Darrell & Malamud, Semyon & Manso, Gustavo, 2015. "Reprint of: Information percolation in segmented markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 158(PB), pages 838-869.
  17. Dang, Tri Vi, 2008. "Bargaining with endogenous information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 140(1), pages 339-354, May.
  18. Serrano-Padial, Ricardo, 2012. "Naive traders and mispricing in prediction markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(5), pages 1882-1912.
  19. Rostek, Marzena & Weretka, Marek, 2015. "Information and strategic behavior," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 158(PB), pages 536-557.
  20. Pavan, Alessandro & Vives, Xavier, 2015. "Information, Coordination, and Market Frictions: An Introduction," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 158(PB), pages 407-426.
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