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Co-worker Complementarity and the Stability of Top Management Teams

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Marc Claveria-Mayol, 2024. "Moral Hazard with Network Effects," Papers 2406.11660, arXiv.org.
  2. Alonso, Ricardo, 2014. "Recruitment and selection in organizations," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 58673, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  3. Kelly E. Carter, 2018. "The Effect of Labor-Management Complementarities on Production and Efficiency When Management Is Paid but Labor Is Not Paid," Eastern Economic Journal, Palgrave Macmillan;Eastern Economic Association, vol. 44(4), pages 535-557, September.
  4. Paul Oyer, 2006. "The Macro-Foundations of Microeconomics: Initial Labor Market Conditions and Long-Term Outcomes for Economists," NBER Working Papers 12157, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. Oyer, Paul & Schaefer, Scott, 2011. "Personnel Economics: Hiring and Incentives," Handbook of Labor Economics, in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 20, pages 1769-1823, Elsevier.
  6. Robert S. Huckman & Jason Barro, 2005. "Cohort Turnover and Productivity: The July Phenomenon in Teaching Hospitals," NBER Working Papers 11182, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  7. Alexandre Mas & Enrico Moretti, 2009. "Peers at Work," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(1), pages 112-145, March.
  8. Petra Thiemann, 2022. "The Persistent Effects of Short-Term Peer Groups on Performance: Evidence from a Natural Experiment in Higher Education," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(2), pages 1131-1148, February.
  9. Matt Marx & Bram Timmermans, 2017. "Hiring Molecules, Not Atoms: Comobility and Wages," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 28(6), pages 1115-1133, December.
  10. Anthony M. Marino & Ján Zábojník, 2008. "Work‐related perks, agency problems, and optimal incentive contracts," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 39(2), pages 565-585, June.
  11. Augustin Landier & Julien Sauvagnat & David Sraer & David Thesmar, 2013. "Bottom-Up Corporate Governance," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 17(1), pages 161-201.
  12. Hee-jung Cho & Ji-Young Ahn, 2018. "The Dark Side of Wars for Talent and Layoffs: Evidence from Korean Firms †," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 10(5), pages 1-18, April.
  13. Liu, Xiaoding, 2016. "Corruption culture and corporate misconduct," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 122(2), pages 307-327.
  14. Zhou, Fuzhao, 2023. "Succession planning and firm innovation," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 58(PA).
  15. Feinberg, Robert & Larson, Nathan, 2024. "Multi-market contact, tacit collusion, and decentralized managerial decision-making," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 97(C).
  16. Joseph Kuehn, 2017. "Accounting For Complementary Skill Sets: Evaluating Individual Marginal Value To A Team In The National Basketball Association," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 55(3), pages 1556-1578, July.
  17. Colak, Gonul & Liljeblom, Eva, 2022. "Easy cleanups or forbearing improvements: The effect of CEO tenure on successor’s performance," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).
  18. Choi, Seungho & Xu, Jing, 2022. "What do boards consider in CEO performance evaluation? Evidence from executive turnover," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 50(C).
  19. Chen, Yuyu & Hensel, Lukas & Yao, Xinjue, 2025. "From Followers to Leaders: The Career Impact of High-Quality Managers," IZA Discussion Papers 17848, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
  20. Xue Wang, 2010. "Increased Disclosure Requirements and Corporate Governance Decisions: Evidence from Chief Financial Officers in the Pre‐ and Post–Sarbanes‐Oxley Periods," Journal of Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 48(4), pages 885-920, September.
  21. Xavier Jaravel & Neviana Petkova & Alex Bell, 2018. "Team-Specific Capital and Innovation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 108(4-5), pages 1034-1073, April.
  22. Francesco D’Acunto & Geoffrey Tate & Liu Yang, 2020. "Entrepreneurial Teams: Diversity of Skills and Early-Stage Growth," Working Papers 20-45, Center for Economic Studies, U.S. Census Bureau.
  23. Patrizia Fanasch & Bernd Frick, 2021. "Filling Big Shoes: CEO and COO Succession Planning in Family Businesses," Working Papers Dissertations 69, Paderborn University, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics.
  24. Ann Bartel & Brianna Cardiff-Hicks & Kathryn Shaw, 2013. "Compensation Matters: Incentives for Multitasking in a Law Firm," NBER Working Papers 19412, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  25. Paul Oyer & Scott Schaefer, 2012. "Firm/Employee Matching: An Industry Study of American Lawyers," NBER Working Papers 18620, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  26. Steven Balsam & So Yean Kwack, 2022. "The impact of connections between the CEO and top executives on appointment, turnover and firm value," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 49(5-6), pages 882-933, May.
  27. Edward P. Lazear & Paul Oyer, 2012. "Personnel Economics [The Handbook of Organizational Economics]," Introductory Chapters,, Princeton University Press.
  28. Hadem, Michael, 2010. "Bedingungen und Konsequenzen des Wechsels von Finanzvorständen - Eine Analyse in großen börsennotierten Unternehmen," EconStor Theses, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, number 43681.
  29. Mei Feng & Weili Ge & Zhejia Ling & Wei Ting Loh, 2024. "Prosocial CEOs, corporate policies, and firm value," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 29(2), pages 1854-1903, June.
  30. Douglas H. Frank, 2012. "As Luck Would Have It: The Effect of the Vietnam Draft Lottery on Long-Term Career Outcomes," Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 51(2), pages 247-274, April.
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