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Advantageous Effects of Regulatory Adverse Selection in the Life Insurance Market

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Hong, Jimin & Seog, S. Hun, 2018. "Life insurance settlement and the monopolistic insurance market," Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 36-50.
  2. R. Guy Thomas, 2008. "Loss Coverage as a Public Policy Objective for Risk Classification Schemes," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 75(4), pages 997-1018, December.
  3. Renaud Bourlès, 2017. "Prevention incentives in long‐term insurance contracts," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 26(3), pages 661-674, September.
  4. Wenan Fei & Claude Fluet & Harris Schlesinger, 2015. "Uncertain Bequest Needs and Long-Term Insurance Contracts," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 82(1), pages 125-148, March.
  5. David A. Cather, 2020. "Reconsidering insurance discrimination and adverse selection in an era of data analytics," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, Palgrave Macmillan;The Geneva Association, vol. 45(3), pages 426-456, July.
  6. Georges Dionne & Casey Rothschild, 2014. "Economic Effects of Risk Classification Bans," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 39(2), pages 184-221, September.
  7. Michael Hoy & Afrasiab Mirza & Asha Sadanand, 2021. "Guaranteed renewable life insurance under demand uncertainty," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 88(1), pages 131-159, March.
  8. Posey, Lisa L. & Thistle, Paul D., 2021. "Genetic testing and genetic discrimination: Public policy when insurance becomes “too expensive”," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(C).
  9. Michael Hoy & Michael Ruse, 2005. "Regulating Genetic Information in Insurance Markets," Risk Management and Insurance Review, American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 8(2), pages 211-237, September.
  10. Finkelstein, Amy & Poterba, James & Rothschild, Casey, 2009. "Redistribution by insurance market regulation: Analyzing a ban on gender-based retirement annuities," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(1), pages 38-58, January.
  11. Karlsson Linnér, Richard & Koellinger, Philipp D., 2022. "Genetic risk scores in life insurance underwriting," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(C).
  12. Vicky Barham & Rose Anne Devlin & Olga Milliken, 2016. "Genetic Health Risks: The Case for Universal Public Health Insurance," Working Papers 1605E, University of Ottawa, Department of Economics.
  13. A. B. Atkinson, 2009. "Economics as a Moral Science," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 76(s1), pages 791-804, October.
  14. Peter, Richard & Richter, Andreas & Thistle, Paul, 2017. "Endogenous information, adverse selection, and prevention: Implications for genetic testing policy," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 95-107.
  15. Fang, Hanming & Wu, Zenan, 2020. "Life insurance and life settlement markets with overconfident policyholders," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 189(C).
  16. Kesternich, Iris & Schumacher, Heiner, 2009. "On the Use of Information in Repeated Insurance Markets," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 280, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
  17. Choi Yun Jeong & Chen Joe & Sawada Yasuyuki, 2015. "Life Insurance and Suicide: Asymmetric Information Revisited," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 15(3), pages 1127-1149, July.
  18. Vijay Aseervatham & Christoph Lex & Spindler, Martin, 2014. "How do unisex rating regulations affect gender differences in insurance premiums?," MEA discussion paper series 201416, Munich Center for the Economics of Aging (MEA) at the Max Planck Institute for Social Law and Social Policy.
  19. Nan Zhu & Daniel Bauer, 2013. "Coherent Pricing of Life Settlements Under Asymmetric Information," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 80(3), pages 827-851, September.
  20. Edmond Baranes & David Bardey, 2015. "Competition between health maintenance organizations and nonintegrated health insurance companies in health insurance markets," Health Economics Review, Springer, vol. 5(1), pages 1-9, December.
  21. Eric Stephens & James R. Thompson, 2015. "Separation Without Exclusion in Financial Insurance," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 82(4), pages 853-864, December.
  22. Casey Rothschild & Paul D. Thistle, 2022. "Supply, demand, and selection in insurance markets: Theory and applications in pictures," Risk Management and Insurance Review, American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 25(4), pages 419-444, December.
  23. Angus Macdonald & Pradip Tapadar, 2010. "Multifactorial Genetic Disorders and Adverse Selection: Epidemiology Meets Economics," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 77(1), pages 155-182, March.
  24. Dionne, Georges & Fombaron, Nathalie & Doherty, Neil, 2012. "Adverse selection in insurance contracting," Working Papers 12-8, HEC Montreal, Canada Research Chair in Risk Management.
  25. Koch, Thomas G., 2014. "One pool to insure them all? Age, risk and the price(s) of medical insurance," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 35(C), pages 1-11.
  26. Chatterjee, Indradeb & Macdonald, Angus S. & Tapadar, Pradip & Thomas, R. Guy, 2021. "When is utilitarian welfare higher under insurance risk pooling?," Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 101(PB), pages 289-301.
  27. repec:pra:mprapa:55343 is not listed on IDEAS
  28. Michael Hoy & Michael Ruse, 2008. "“No Solution to This Dilemma Exists”: Discrimination, Insurance, and the Human Genome Project," Working Papers 0808, University of Guelph, Department of Economics and Finance.
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