Dynamic information disclosure

Citations

Cited by:

1. Shih-Tang Su & Vijay G. Subramanian & Grant Schoenebeck, 2021. "Bayesian Persuasion in Sequential Trials," Papers 2110.09594, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2021.
2. Au, Pak Hung & Kawai, Keiichi, 2020. "Competitive information disclosure by multiple senders," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 56-78.
3. Caio Lorecchio, 2022. "Persuading crowds," UB School of Economics Working Papers 2022/434, University of Barcelona School of Economics.
4. Belay, Dagim G. & Jensen, Jørgen D., 2020. "‘The scarlet letters’: Information disclosure and self-regulation: Evidence from antibiotic use in Denmark," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 104(C).
5. Kolotilin, Anton & Li, Hongyi, 2021. "Relational communication," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 16(4), November.
   • Anton Kolotilin & Hongyi, 2018. "Relational Communication," Discussion Papers 2018-12, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
   • Anton Kolotilin & Hongyi, 2019. "Relational Communication," Discussion Papers 2018-12a, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
   • Anton Kolotilin & Hongyi Li, 2019. "Relational Communication," Papers 1901.05645, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2020.
   • Anton Kolotilin & Hongyi, 2020. "Relational Communication," Discussion Papers 2018-12b, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
6. Anton Kolotilin & Tymofiy Mylovanov & Andriy Zapechelnyuk & Ming Li, 2017. "Persuasion of a Privately Informed Receiver," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 85(6), pages 1949-1964, November.
   • Anton Kolotilin & Tymofiy Mylovanov & Andriy Zapechelnyuk & Ming Li, 2016. "Persuasion Of A Privately Informed Receiver," Working Papers 2016_22, Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow.
   • Anton Kolotilin & Tymofiy Mylovanov & Andriy Zapechelnyuk & Ming Li, 2016. "Persuasion of a Privately Informed Receiver," Discussion Papers 2016-21, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
7. Zhao, Wei & Mezzetti, Claudio & Renou, Ludovic & Tomala, Tristan, 2024. "Contracting over persistent information," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 19(2), May.
   • Wei Zhao & Claudio Mezzetti & Ludovic Renou & Tristan Tomala, 2020. "Contracting over persistent information," Papers 2007.05983, arXiv.org, revised Mar 2021.
   • Zhao, Wei & Mezzetti, Claudio & Renou, Ludovic & Tomala, Tristan, 2022. "Contracting over Persistent Information," CEPR Discussion Papers 16896, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
8. Pak Hung Au & Keiichi Kawai, 2021. "Competitive disclosure of correlated information," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 72(3), pages 767-799, October.
9. Ian Ball, 2023. "Dynamic Information Provision: Rewarding the Past and Guiding the Future," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 91(4), pages 1363-1391, July.
10. Jan Knoepfle, 2024. "Dynamic Competition for Attention," Papers 2409.18595, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2024.
11. Kirschstein, Thomas, 2018. "Planning of multi-product pipelines by economic lot scheduling models," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 264(1), pages 327-339.
12. Li, Xuelin & Szydlowski, Martin & Yu, Fangyuan, 2025. "Dynamic information design in an entry game," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 226(C).
13. Szydlowski, Martin, 2024. "Fomenting conflict," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 220(C).
14. Kaya, Ayça, 2023. "Paying with information," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), May.
15. Simon Board & Jay Lu, 2018. "Competitive Information Disclosure in Search Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 126(5), pages 1965-2010.
16. Ronen Gradwohl & Niklas Hahn & Martin Hoefer & Rann Smorodinsky, 2020. "Reaping the Informational Surplus in Bayesian Persuasion," Papers 2006.02048, arXiv.org.
17. Hahn, Niklas & Hoefer, Martin & Smorodinsky, Rann, 2022. "The secretary recommendation problem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 199-228.
18. Aïd, René & Bonesini, Ofelia & Callegaro, Giorgia & Campi, Luciano, 2025. "Continuous-time persuasion by filtering," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 127889, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
19. Jacopo Bizzotto & Adrien Vigier, 2021. "Can a better informed listener be easier to persuade?," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 72(3), pages 705-721, October.
20. Ehud Lehrer & Dimitry Shaiderman, 2022. "Markovian Persuasion with Stochastic Revelations," Papers 2204.08659, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2025.
21. Farzaneh Farhadi & Demosthenis Teneketzis, 2022. "Dynamic Information Design: A Simple Problem on Optimal Sequential Information Disclosure," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 12(2), pages 443-484, June.
22. Itai Arieli & Yakov Babichenko & Dima Shaiderman & Xianwen Shi, 2025. "Persuading while Learning," Working Papers tecipa-791, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
23. Yifan Jiao & Christopher S. Tang & Jingqi Wang, 2021. "Selling Virtual Items in Free-to-Play Games: Transparent Selling vs. Opaque Selling," Service Science, INFORMS, vol. 13(2), pages 53-76, June.
24. Deepanshu Vasal, 2020. "Dynamic information design," Papers 2005.07267, arXiv.org.
25. Parakhonyak, Alexei & Vikander, Nick, 2023. "Information design through scarcity and social learning," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 207(C).
26. Aïd, René & Bonesini, Ofelia & Callegaro, Giorgia & Campi, Luciano, 2025. "Continuous-time persuasion by filtering," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 176(C).
27. Lily Ling Yang, 2024. "Information Design with Costly State Verifi cation," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2024_502, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.