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Costly Information Disclosure in Oligopoly

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Mingfeng Lin & Paulo Goes, 2012. "The Appeal of Third-party Certifications: Information Unraveling in Natural Experiments," Working Papers 12-02, NET Institute.
  2. Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 2008. "Products Liability, Signaling and Disclosure," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 164(1), pages 106-126, March.
  3. Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 2008. "Communicating quality: a unified model of disclosure and signalling," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 39(4), pages 973-989, December.
  4. Janssen, Maarten, 2017. "Regulating False Discloure," VfS Annual Conference 2017 (Vienna): Alternative Structures for Money and Banking 168159, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
  5. Panos Markopoulos & Kartik Hosanagar, 2013. "A Model of Product Design and Information Disclosure Investments," Working Papers 13-25, NET Institute.
  6. Kim Jeong-Yoo, 2015. "On Public Host Liability," Asian Journal of Law and Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 6(2), pages 283-292, October.
  7. Allard Made, 2014. "Information Provision by Interest Groups," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 58(4), pages 649-664, August.
  8. Ting Liu & Monic Jiayin Sun, 2007. "Informal Payments in Developing Countries' Public Health Sectors¤," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series WP2007-032, Boston University - Department of Economics.
  9. Schmitt, Stefanie Y. & Bruckner, Dominik, 2023. "Unaware consumers and disclosure of deficiencies," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 142(C), pages 1018-1042.
  10. Ganesh Iyer & Shubhranshu Singh, 2022. "Persuasion Contest: Disclosing Own and Rival Information," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 41(4), pages 682-709, July.
  11. Calderon Monge, María Esther & Huerta, Pilar Angelica, 2015. "Lucro líquido do franqueado: um sinal para a escolha de franquia em época de crise," RAE - Revista de Administração de Empresas, FGV-EAESP Escola de Administração de Empresas de São Paulo (Brazil), vol. 55(6), November.
  12. Panos M. Markopoulos & Kartik Hosanagar, 2018. "A Model of Product Design and Information Disclosure Investments," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 64(2), pages 739-759, February.
  13. Tianle Song, 2022. "Quality Disclosure and Product Selection," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 70(2), pages 323-346, June.
  14. Huan Cao & Xu Guan & Tijun Fan & Li Zhou, 2020. "The Acquisition of Quality Information in a Supply Chain with Voluntary vs. Mandatory Disclosure," Production and Operations Management, Production and Operations Management Society, vol. 29(3), pages 595-616, March.
  15. Dan Levin & James Peck & Lixin Ye, 2009. "Quality Disclosure And Competition," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 57(1), pages 167-196, March.
  16. Alipranti, Maria & Mitrokostas, Evangelos & Petrakis, Emmanuel, 2016. "Non-comparative and comparative advertising in oligopolistic markets," DICE Discussion Papers 231, Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
  17. Ginzburg, Boris, 2019. "A Simple Model of Competitive Testing," MPRA Paper 99463, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  18. Steven C. Michael, 2009. "Entrepreneurial signaling to attract resources: the case of franchising," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 30(6), pages 405-422.
  19. Levent Celik, 2014. "Information Unraveling Revisited: Disclosure of Horizontal Attributes," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 62(1), pages 113-136, March.
  20. Chen, Yijuan & Hu, Xiangting & Li, Sanxi, 2017. "Quality differentiation and firms’ choices between online and physical markets," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 96-132.
  21. Winand Emons & Claude Fluet, 2019. "Strategic communication with reporting costs," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 87(3), pages 341-363, October.
  22. Xinyu Li & Ronald Peeters, 2017. "Rivalry information acquisition and disclosure," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 26(3), pages 610-623, September.
  23. Leonardo Martin Mastrangelo & Esther Calderon-Monge & Pilar Huerta-Zavala, 2016. "Franchise fairs: A relevant signal in franchise choice in social activity," Contemporary Economics, University of Economics and Human Sciences in Warsaw., vol. 10(3), September.
  24. Farhad Sadeh & Manish Kacker, 2018. "Quality signaling through ex-ante voluntary information disclosure in entrepreneurial networks: evidence from franchising," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 50(4), pages 729-748, April.
  25. Frederick Dongchuhl Oh & Junghum Park, 2019. "Potential competition and quality disclosure," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(4), pages 614-630, November.
  26. Maxim Ivanov, 2013. "Information revelation in competitive markets," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 52(1), pages 337-365, January.
  27. Hedlund, Jonas, 2015. "Persuasion with communication costs," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 28-40.
  28. V. Joseph Hotz & Mo Xiao, 2013. "Strategic Information Disclosure: The Case Of Multiattribute Products With Heterogeneous Consumers," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 51(1), pages 865-881, January.
  29. Levent Celik, 2014. "A More General Framework to Analyze Whether Voluntary Disclosure is Insufficient or Excessive," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 44(2), pages 161-178, March.
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