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On Public Host Liability

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  • Kim Jeong-Yoo

Abstract

Civil laws or commercial laws in many countries stipulate the liability of the public host whereby a public host is liable for the losses due to damage or lost of the property of the guest left to the host. In this paper, we consider the situation in which the value of the property is ex ante not known to the host. In this case, we show that the voluntary information disclosure rule is more efficient than the mandatory information disclosure rule. We also derive some implications on Article 153 of the Korean Commercial Law prescribing for this case.

Suggested Citation

  • Kim Jeong-Yoo, 2015. "On Public Host Liability," Asian Journal of Law and Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 6(2), pages 283-292, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:bpj:ajlecn:v:6:y:2015:i:2:p:283-292:n:5
    DOI: 10.1515/ajle-2015-0011
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Grossman, Sanford J, 1981. "The Informational Role of Warranties and Private Disclosure about Product Quality," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 24(3), pages 461-483, December.
    2. Insuk Cheong & Jeong‐Yoo Kim, 2004. "Costly Information Disclosure in Oligopoly," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 52(1), pages 121-132, March.
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