Monotone comparative statics with separable objective functions
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Other versions of this item:
- Christian Ewerhart, 2010. "Monotone comparative statics with separable objective functions," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 30(3), pages 2259-2269.
References listed on IDEAS
- Van Zandt, Timothy & Vives, Xavier, 2007.
"Monotone equilibria in Bayesian games of strategic complementarities,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 134(1), pages 339-360, May.
- Van Zandt, Timothy & Vives, Xavier, 2003. "Monotone Equilibria in Bayesian Games of Strategic Complementarities," CEPR Discussion Papers 4103, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
More about this item
KeywordsSupermodularity; separable objective function; single crossing condition; quantity competition.;
- C02 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General - - - Mathematical Economics
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C65 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Miscellaneous Mathematical Tools
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-04-17 (All new papers)
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