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A Proposal for a Flexible Europe


  • Bruno S. Frey
  • Reiner Eichenberger


At present, new EU-members have to fully accept the "acquis communautaire" even if their economic and institutional development differs drastically from the EU-average. In contrast, we propose that there should be the possibility of partial entry into the EU. East European Countries should have the option of specifically entering with respect to functions where they expect positive net benefits. In order to enable such partial entry, a new type of jurisdictions called FOCJ (Functional, Overlapping and Competing Jurisdictions) is proposed between the EU, the CEECs, and beyond. Such FOCJ allow for partial integration based on economic efficiency and democratic rules.

Suggested Citation

  • Bruno S. Frey & Reiner Eichenberger, "undated". "A Proposal for a Flexible Europe," IEW - Working Papers 056, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
  • Handle: RePEc:zur:iewwpx:056

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Casella, Alessandra & Frey, Bruno, 1992. "Federalism and clubs : Towards an economic theory of overlapping political jurisdictions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 36(2-3), pages 639-646, April.
    2. Frey, Bruno S, 1994. "Direct Democracy: Politico-economic Lessons from Swiss Experience," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(2), pages 338-342, May.
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    Cited by:

    1. Aleksander Berentsen & Guillaume Rocheteau, 2003. "Money and the Gains from Trade," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 44(1), pages 263-297, February.
    2. Knoll Bodo & Koenig Andreas, 2011. "Leviathan Europa – Stärkung der Nationalstaaten und der EU durch konstitutionelle Schranken?," Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik, De Gruyter, vol. 60(2), pages 127-145, August.
    3. Karl, Helmut & Demir, Serhat, 2015. "Koordination der Europäischen Kohäsionspolitik in der Förderperiode 2014-2020: Zu den Kommissionsvorschlägen für einen Gemeinsamen Strategischen Rahmen der Europäischen Struktur- und Innovationsfonds," Forschungsberichte der ARL: Aufsätze,in: Koordination raumwirksamer Politik: Mehr Effizienz und Wirksamkeit von Politik durch abgestimmte Arbeitsteilung, pages 7-22 Akademie für Raumforschung und Landesplanung (ARL) - Leibniz-Forum für Raumwissenschaften.
    4. Aleksander Berentsen & Guillaume Rocheteau, 2004. "Money and Information," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 71(4), pages 915-944.
    5. Berentsen, Aleksander & Rocheteau, Guillaume, 2002. "On the efficiency of monetary exchange: how divisibility of money matters," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(8), pages 1621-1649, November.
    6. Reto Foellmi & Urs Meister, 2005. "Product-Market Competition in the Water Industry: Voluntary Non-discriminatory Pricing," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 5(2), pages 115-135, June.
    7. Brandi, Clara & Wohlgemuth, Michael, 2006. "Strategies of Flexible Integration and Enlargement of the European Union: a Club-theoretical and Constitutional Economics Perspective," Freiburg Discussion Papers on Constitutional Economics 06/7, Walter Eucken Institut e.V..
    8. Wohlgemuth, Michael, 2011. "The boundaries of the state," Freiburg Discussion Papers on Constitutional Economics 11/3, Walter Eucken Institut e.V..
    9. Schenk-Hoppe, Klaus Reiner & Schmalfu[ss], Bjorn, 2001. "Random fixed points in a stochastic Solow growth model," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 19-30, September.

    More about this item


    keywords: federalism; constutitutional economics; public choice; europe;

    JEL classification:

    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • H4 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods
    • H5 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies

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