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Antitrust immunity for airline alliances

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  • Bilotkach, Volodymyr
  • Hüschelrath, Kai

Abstract

The market developments in international air transportation have led to the dominance of three global airline alliances - Star, SkyTeam and oneworld. At the same time, members of these alliances receive increasingly more freedom in coordinating various aspects of joint operations, including scheduling and pricing decisions, as well as the right to form revenue-sharing joint ventures in international markets. Although the significant consumer benefits generated by airline cooperation are undisputed, the recent developments raise antitrust concerns. Against this background, the paper compares the key competitive effects of airline alliances and antitrust immunity with the economic lines of reasoning in recent policy actions to develop recommendations for a full-fledged assessment of antitrust immunity for airline alliances.

Suggested Citation

  • Bilotkach, Volodymyr & Hüschelrath, Kai, 2010. "Antitrust immunity for airline alliances," ZEW Discussion Papers 10-080, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:zewdip:10080
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    Cited by:

    1. Chiambaretto, Paul & Decker, Christopher, 2012. "Air–rail intermodal agreements: Balancing the competition and environmental effects," Journal of Air Transport Management, Elsevier, vol. 23(C), pages 36-40.
    2. Czerny, Achim I. & Jost, Peter-J. & Lang, Hao & Mantin, Benny, 2021. "Carrier collaboration with endogenous networks: Or, the limits of what carrier collaboration can achieve under antitrust immunity," Journal of Air Transport Management, Elsevier, vol. 94(C).
    3. Firgo, Matthias & Kügler, Agnes, 2014. "Detecting Collusion in Spatially Differentiated Markets," Department of Economics Working Paper Series 188, WU Vienna University of Economics and Business.
    4. Volodymyr Bilotkach, 2019. "Airline Partnerships, Antitrust Immunity, and Joint Ventures: What We Know and What I Think We Would Like to Know," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 54(1), pages 37-60, February.
    5. Fatih Cemil Ozbugday, 2013. "Individual Exemption Applications and Their Assessment: Lessons from the Competition Law Change in the Netherlands during the 1990s," Business and Management Research, Business and Management Research, Sciedu Press, vol. 2(4), pages 148-164, December.
    6. Volodymyr Bilotkach & Kai Hüschelrath, 2013. "Airline Alliances, Antitrust Immunity, and Market Foreclosure," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 95(4), pages 1368-1385, October.
    7. Víctor Valdés, 2013. "Fallas del mercado y del gobierno en el sector aeronáutico mexicano," Revista de Economía Institucional, Universidad Externado de Colombia - Facultad de Economía, vol. 15(29), pages 253-283, July-Dece.
    8. Alderighi, Marco & Gaggero, Alberto A., 2018. "Flight cancellations and airline alliances: Empirical evidence from Europe," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 116(C), pages 90-101.
    9. Bilotkach, Volodymyr & Hüschelrath, Kai, 2012. "Airline alliances and antitrust policy: The role of efficiencies," Journal of Air Transport Management, Elsevier, vol. 21(C), pages 76-84.
    10. Xia, Wenyi & Zhang, Anming, 2016. "High-speed rail and air transport competition and cooperation: A vertical differentiation approach," Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 456-481.
    11. de Jong, Gerben & Behrens, Christiaan & van Herk, Hester & Verhoef, Erik, 2022. "Airfares with codeshares: (why) are consumers willing to pay more for products of foreign firms with a domestic partner?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 193(C), pages 1-18.
    12. Brouwer, E. & Ozbugday, F.C., 2011. "Competition Law, Antitrust Immunity and Profits : A Dynamic Panel Analysis," Discussion Paper 2011-038, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    13. Alderighi, Marco & Gaggero, Alberto A. & Piga, Claudio A., 2015. "The effect of code-share agreements on the temporal profile of airline fares," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 79(C), pages 42-54.
    14. Alderighi, Marco & Gaggero, Alberto A., 2014. "The effects of global alliances on international flight frequencies: Some evidence from Italy," Journal of Air Transport Management, Elsevier, vol. 39(C), pages 30-33.
    15. Gayle, Philip G. & Thomas, Tyson, 2016. "Assessing firm behavior in carve-out markets: Evidence on the impact of carve-out policy," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 128(C), pages 178-194.
    16. Bilotkach, Volodymyr & Hüschelrath, Kai, 2019. "Balancing competition and cooperation: Evidence from transatlantic airline markets," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 1-16.
    17. Liu, Shaoxuan & Oum, Tae Hoon, 2018. "Prospects for air policy liberalization in China as a Result of China-ASEAN Open Skies: Changing role of Chinese mega carriers in global scene and anticipated Low Cost Carrier competition," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 1-9.
    18. Stephen Martin, 2012. "Market Structure and Market Performance," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 40(2), pages 87-108, March.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
    • L93 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Air Transportation
    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law

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