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Optimal Operating Mode of a Platform

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  • Reimer, Julia
  • Doganoglu, Toker

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • Reimer, Julia & Doganoglu, Toker, 2023. "Optimal Operating Mode of a Platform," VfS Annual Conference 2023 (Regensburg): Growth and the "sociale Frage" 277683, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:vfsc23:277683
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    File URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/277683/1/vfs-2023-pid-87260.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Bergès-Sennou Fabian & Bontems Philippe & Réquillart Vincent, 2004. "Economics of Private Labels: A Survey of Literature," Journal of Agricultural & Food Industrial Organization, De Gruyter, vol. 2(1), pages 1-25, February.
    2. Hervas-Drane, Andres & Shelegia, Sandro, 2022. "Price competition with a stake in your rival," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 84(C).
    3. Andrei Hagiu & Bruno Jullien & Julian Wright, 2020. "Creating Platforms by Hosting Rivals," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(7), pages 3234-3248, July.
    4. Federico Etro, 2021. "Product selection in online marketplaces," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(3), pages 614-637, August.
    5. Andrei Hagiu & Tat‐How Teh & Julian Wright, 2022. "Should platforms be allowed to sell on their own marketplaces?," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 53(2), pages 297-327, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D42 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Monopoly
    • L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General
    • L81 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Retail and Wholesale Trade; e-Commerce

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