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Losen statt Stimmverluste unter Prozent-Hürden und bei Sitzanteilen

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  • Dilger, Alexander

Abstract

Prozent-Hürden sollen eine Zersplitterung in Parlamenten verhindern und Parteien nur in Fraktionsstärke hineinlassen. Dazu werden bislang die Stimmen für Parteien unterhalb der Hürde gar nicht berücksichtigt. Diese Ungleichheit der Wahl und Benachteiligung von kleinen Parteien ließe sich dadurch vermeiden, dass von den kleineren Parteien unterhalb der Hürde eine ausgelost wird, die die Mandate für die Stimmen all dieser kleinen Parteien erhält. Alternativ könnte jede kleinere Partei mit einer Wahrscheinlichkeit, die zu ihrem Stimmanteil proportional ist, in Fraktionsstärke einziehen oder eine freiwillige Bildung von Losgemeinschaften erlaubt werden. Schließlich kann das Losen auch als Alternative zu den gängigen Wahlverfahren verwendet werden, um Bruchteile an Mandaten zuzuteilen oder um Stichwahlen um eine Position zu ersetzen.

Suggested Citation

  • Dilger, Alexander, 2021. "Losen statt Stimmverluste unter Prozent-Hürden und bei Sitzanteilen," Discussion Papers of the Institute for Organisational Economics 8/2021, University of Münster, Institute for Organisational Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:umiodp:82021
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Demko, Stephen & Hill, Theodore P., 1988. "Equitable distribution of indivisible objects," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 145-158, October.
    2. Dilger, Alexander, 2021. "Einfache Vermeidung von Stimmverlusten durch Prozent-Hürden," Discussion Papers of the Institute for Organisational Economics 7/2021, University of Münster, Institute for Organisational Economics.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • K16 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Election Law

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