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Einfache Vermeidung von Stimmverlusten durch Prozent-Hürden

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  • Dilger, Alexander

Abstract

Prozent-Hürden führen normalerweise dazu, dass Stimmen verfallen, was der Gleichheit der Wahl widerspricht und die Chancen kleinerer sowie neuer Parteien mindert. Es gibt mehrere mögliche Auswege, z. B. durch Präferenzwahl. Noch einfacher ist es, wenn jede Partei angibt, an welche andere Partei ihre Stimmen gehen sollen, falls sie selbst an der Prozent-Hürde scheitert.

Suggested Citation

  • Dilger, Alexander, 2021. "Einfache Vermeidung von Stimmverlusten durch Prozent-Hürden," Discussion Papers of the Institute for Organisational Economics 7/2021, University of Münster, Institute for Organisational Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:umiodp:72021
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    File URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/236629/1/1765885418.pdf
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    Cited by:

    1. Dilger, Alexander, 2021. "Losen statt Stimmverluste unter Prozent-Hürden und bei Sitzanteilen," Discussion Papers of the Institute for Organisational Economics 8/2021, University of Münster, Institute for Organisational Economics.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • K16 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Election Law

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