Special interest groups and 4th best transport pricing
This paper is organized as follows. In order to explain the basic idea of 4th best pricing more fully the following Section 2 will sketch and discuss the above mentioned Laffont model, where it is shown that under certain conditions a uniform tariff may be preferable to an optional tariff because such a uniform tariff is less amenable to the influence of interest groups. Section 3 will illustrate Laffont?s insight with several examples from the transport sector. Section 4 will conclude.
|Date of creation:||2006|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Mommsenstraße 13, 01062 Dresden|
Web page: https://tu-dresden.de/bu/verkehr/ivw?set_language=en
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Gasmi, F. & Laffont, J. J. & Sharkey, W. W., 2000.
"Competition, universal service and telecommunications policy in developing countries,"
Information Economics and Policy,
Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 221-248, September.
- Gasmi, Farid & Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Sharkey, William, 1999. "Competition, Universal Service and Telecommunications Policy in Developing Countries," IDEI Working Papers 92, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- Rothengatter, Werner, 2003. "How good is first best? Marginal cost and other pricing principles for user charging in transport," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 121-130, April.
- Theodore Keeler, 1984. "Theories of regulation and the deregulation movement," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 44(1), pages 103-145, January.
- Jens Schade & Bernhard Schlag, 2000. "Acceptability of Urban Transport Pricing," Research Reports 72, Government Institute for Economic Research Finland (VATT).
- James Konow, 2003. "Which Is the Fairest One of All? A Positive Analysis of Justice Theories," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 41(4), pages 1188-1239, December. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:tudiwv:12006. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (ZBW - German National Library of Economics)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.