IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/zbw/rwirep/121.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Killing them with Kindness: Negative Distributional Externalities of Increasing UI Benefits

Author

Listed:
  • Haisken-DeNew, John P.
  • Vorell, Matthias

Abstract

Of the many labour market Hartz IV reforms that have been implemented in Germany since 2005, the role of short-term unemployment insurance has not received much attention. In this paper we examine distributional effects of labour earnings and unemployment benefits using simulated increases in unemployment insurance replacement rates or equivalently, increases in the net present value of benefit duration. Starting around an 18%-point increase in the replacement rate, there are significant negative labour supply effects, drawing those employed into unemployment shifting the mass of the earnings distribution to the left. At around a 25%-point increase in the replacement rate, the mass of the distribution shifts right again, as those receiving unemployment benefits simply enjoy an increased transfer. Thus, due to the substantial negative labour supply effects, German economic policy should avoid potentially increasing the UI benefit replacement rate (or equivalently, increasing the benefit duration) in the near future as a response to the worldwide economic crisis.

Suggested Citation

  • Haisken-DeNew, John P. & Vorell, Matthias, 2009. "Killing them with Kindness: Negative Distributional Externalities of Increasing UI Benefits," Ruhr Economic Papers 121, RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-University Bochum, TU Dortmund University, University of Duisburg-Essen.
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:rwirep:121
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/29895/1/605640580.PDF
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Jaap H. Abbring & Gerard J. Berg & Jan C. Ours, 2005. "The Effect of Unemployment Insurance Sanctions on the Transition Rate from Unemployment to Employment," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 115(505), pages 602-630, July.
    2. DiNardo, John & Fortin, Nicole M & Lemieux, Thomas, 1996. "Labor Market Institutions and the Distribution of Wages, 1973-1992: A Semiparametric Approach," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(5), pages 1001-1044, September.
    3. Jan Boone & Peter Fredriksson & Bertil Holmlund & Jan C. van Ours, 2007. "Optimal Unemployment Insurance with Monitoring and Sanctions," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 117(518), pages 399-421, March.
    4. Lechner, Michael & Wunsch, Conny & Huber, Martin & Walter, Thomas, 2009. "Do German Welfare-to-Work Programmes Reduce Welfare and Increase Work?," CEPR Discussion Papers 7238, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    5. Burkhard Heer, 2002. "The German Unemployment Compensation System: Effects On Aggregate Savings And Wealth Distribution," Review of Income and Wealth, International Association for Research in Income and Wealth, vol. 48(3), pages 371-394, September.
    6. James J. Heckman & Jeffrey Smith & Nancy Clements, 1997. "Making The Most Out Of Programme Evaluations and Social Experiments: Accounting For Heterogeneity in Programme Impacts," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 64(4), pages 487-535.
    7. Elke Lüdemann & Ralf Wilke & Xuan Zhang, 2006. "Censored quantile regressions and the length of unemployment periods in West Germany," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 31(4), pages 1003-1024, November.
    8. Lee, Sokbae & Wilke, Ralf A., 2009. "Reform of Unemployment Compensation in Germany: A Nonparametric Bounds Analysis Using Register Data," Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, American Statistical Association, vol. 27(2), pages 193-205.
    9. Peter Fredriksson & Bertil Holmlund, 2006. "Improving Incentives in Unemployment Insurance: A Review of Recent Research," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 20(3), pages 357-386, July.
    10. Ham, John C & Rea, Samuel A, Jr, 1987. "Unemployment Insurance and Male Unemployment Duration in Canada," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 5(3), pages 325-353, July.
    11. Hendrik Schmitz & Viktor Steiner, 2007. "Benefit-Entitlement Effects and the Duration of Unemployment: An Ex-ante Evaluation of Recent Labour Market Reforms in Germany," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 678, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
    12. repec:zbw:rwirep:0117 is not listed on IDEAS
    13. James J. Heckman, 2000. "Causal Parameters and Policy Analysis in Economics: A Twentieth Century Retrospective," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 115(1), pages 45-97.
    14. Hopenhayn, Hugo A & Nicolini, Juan Pablo, 1997. "Optimal Unemployment Insurance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(2), pages 412-438, April.
    15. Jacobi, Lena & Kluve, Jochen, 2007. "Before and after the Hartz reforms: The performance of active labour market policy in Germany," Zeitschrift für ArbeitsmarktForschung - Journal for Labour Market Research, Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (IAB), Nürnberg [Institute for Employment Research, Nuremberg, Germany], vol. 40(1), pages 45-64.
    16. Michael Baker & Samuel A. Rea, 1998. "Employment Spells And Unemployment Insurance Eligibility Requirements," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 80(1), pages 80-94, February.
    17. Meyer, Bruce D, 1990. "Unemployment Insurance and Unemployment Spells," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(4), pages 757-782, July.
    18. Kai-Uwe Müller & Viktor Steiner, 2008. "Imposed Benefit Sanctions and the Unemployment-to-Employment Transition: The German Experience," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 792, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
    19. Martin Biewen & Ralf Wilke, 2005. "Unemployment duration and the length of entitlement periods for unemployment benefits: do the IAB employment subsample and the German Socio-Economic Panel yield the same results?," AStA Advances in Statistical Analysis, Springer;German Statistical Society, vol. 89(2), pages 209-236, June.
    20. Schmidt, Christoph M., 1999. "Knowing What Works: The Case for Rigorous Program Evaluation," IZA Discussion Papers 77, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    21. Jacobi, Lena & Kluve, Jochen, 2007. "Before and after the Hartz reforms: The performance of active labour market policy in Germany," Zeitschrift für ArbeitsmarktForschung - Journal for Labour Market Research, Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (IAB), Nürnberg [Institute for Employment Research, Nuremberg, Germany], vol. 40(1), pages 45-64.
    22. Müller, Kai-Uwe & Steiner, Viktor, 2008. "Imposed Benefit Sanctions and the Unemployment-to-Employment Transition: The German Experience," IZA Discussion Papers 3483, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    23. Alfonso Alba-Ramirez, 1999. "Explaining the transitions out of unemployment in Spain: the effect of unemployment insurance," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 31(2), pages 183-193.
    24. Ralf A. Wilke, 2005. "New Extimates of the Duration and Risk of Unemployment for West-Germany," Schmollers Jahrbuch : Journal of Applied Social Science Studies / Zeitschrift für Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, vol. 125(2), pages 207-237.
    25. Jacobi, Lena & Kluve, Jochen, 2007. "Before and after the Hartz reforms: The performance of active labour market policy in Germany," Zeitschrift für ArbeitsmarktForschung - Journal for Labour Market Research, Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (IAB), Nürnberg [Institute for Employment Research, Nuremberg, Germany], vol. 40(1), pages 45-64.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. repec:zbw:rwirep:0121 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. John P. Haisken-DeNew & Matthias Vorell, 2009. "Killing them with Kindness: Negative Distributional Externalities of Increasing UI Benefits," Ruhr Economic Papers 0121, Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universität Dortmund, Universität Duisburg-Essen.
    3. Haisken-DeNew, John P. & Schmidt, Christoph M., 2009. "Nickel and Dimed German Style: The Working Poor in Germany," Ruhr Economic Papers 122, RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-University Bochum, TU Dortmund University, University of Duisburg-Essen.
    4. Boockmann, Bernhard & Thomsen, Stephan L. & Walter, Thomas, 2009. "Intensifying the use of benefit sanctions: an effective tool to shorten welfare receipt and speed up transitions to employment?," ZEW Discussion Papers 09-072, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    5. John P. Haisken-DeNew & Christoph M. Schmidt, 2009. "Nickel and Dimed German Style: The Working Poor in Germany," Ruhr Economic Papers 0122, Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universität Dortmund, Universität Duisburg-Essen.
    6. repec:zbw:rwirep:0122 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. McGuinness, Seamus & O'Connell, Philip J. & Kelly, Elish & Walsh, John R., 2011. "Activation in Ireland: An Evaluation of the National Employment Action Plan," Research Series, Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI), number RS20, June.
    8. Kelly, Elish & McGuinness, Seamus & O'Connell, Philip J., 2011. "What Can Active Labour Market Policies Do?," Papers EC1, Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI).
    9. Tito Boeri & Jan van Ours, 2013. "The Economics of Imperfect Labor Markets: Second Edition," Economics Books, Princeton University Press, edition 1, number 10142.
    10. Simoes, Nadia, 2013. "Subsídio de desemprego: uma revisão da literatura teórica e empírica [Unemployment insurance: a survey]," MPRA Paper 52332, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    11. Peter Fredriksson & Bertil Holmlund, 2006. "Improving Incentives in Unemployment Insurance: A Review of Recent Research," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 20(3), pages 357-386, July.
    12. Demougin, Dominique M. & Helm, Carsten, 2008. "Incentive contracts and efficient unemployment benefits," Darmstadt Discussion Papers in Economics 191, Darmstadt University of Technology, Department of Law and Economics.
    13. Milan Vodopivec, 2004. "Income Support for the Unemployed : Issues and Options," World Bank Publications - Books, The World Bank Group, number 14922, December.
    14. Busk, Henna, 2016. "Sanctions and the exit from unemployment in two different benefit schemes," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 159-176.
    15. Ofer Setty, 2019. "Optimal unemployment insurance with monitoring," Quantitative Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 10(2), pages 693-733, May.
    16. Krebs, Tom & Scheffel, Martin, 2016. "Structural Reform in Germany," IZA Discussion Papers 9787, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    17. Aldashev, Alisher & Thomsen, Stephan L. & Walter, Thomas, 2010. "Short-term training programs for immigrants: do effects differ from natives and why?," ZEW Discussion Papers 10-021, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    18. Tom Krebs & Martin Scheffel, 2016. "Labor Market Institutions and the Cost of Recessions," CESifo Working Paper Series 6262, CESifo.
    19. Konstantinos Tatsiramos & Jan C. Ours, 2014. "Labor Market Effects Of Unemployment Insurance Design," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(2), pages 284-311, April.
    20. Kloß, Michael & Nagl, Wolfgang, 2013. "Unemployment compensation and unemployment duration - Evidence from the German Hartz IV reform," VfS Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79711, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    21. Stephan L. Thomsen & Thomas Walter, 2010. "Temporary Extra Jobs for Immigrants: Merging Lane to Employment or Dead‐End Road in Welfare?," LABOUR, CEIS, vol. 24(s1), pages 114-140, December.
    22. Sebastien Menard, 2019. "The impact of benefit sanctions on equilibrium wage dispersion and job vacancies," TEPP Working Paper 2019-08, TEPP.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Unemployment; income distribution; labour supply;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • J65 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings
    • D31 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - Personal Income and Wealth Distribution
    • J22 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Time Allocation and Labor Supply

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:rwirep:121. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/rwiesde.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.