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Effectiveness of the European semester: Explaining domestic consent and contestation

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  • Maatsch, Aleksandra

Abstract

Do parliamentary parties politicize compliance within the European Semester? If so, which conflict lines organize parliamentary debates? In order to address these questions, this discussion paper analyses national parliamentary participation in two budgetary cycles of the European Semester (2014 and 2015) in Austria, France, Germany, and Ireland. While in France and Germany, compliance within the European Semester has been subject to strong politicization, this has not been the case in Austria and Ireland. Moreover, strong politicization coincided with the contestation of country-specific recommendations among the parliamentary parties. The empirical analysis established that strong formal powers in budgetary matters constitute an important prerequisite allowing parliamentary parties to articulate their contestation. However, the willingness to comply depends most directly on whether the content of country-specific recommendations is coherent with the economic preferences of a political party, not the government-opposition cleavage.

Suggested Citation

  • Maatsch, Aleksandra, 2017. "Effectiveness of the European semester: Explaining domestic consent and contestation," MPIfG Discussion Paper 17/6, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:mpifgd:176
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Marjoleine Hennis, 2022. "Par le Haut Ou Par les Pays‐Bas? French and Dutch Approaches to European Social Policy Coordination Compared," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 60(1), pages 136-151, January.
    2. Christian Schweiger, 2021. "Parliamentary Scrutiny of the European Semester: The Case of Poland," Politics and Governance, Cogitatio Press, vol. 9(3), pages 124-134.
    3. Cristina Fasone, 2021. "Do Independent Fiscal Institutions Enhance Parliamentary Accountability in the Eurozone?," Politics and Governance, Cogitatio Press, vol. 9(3), pages 135-144.
    4. Ivana Skazlic, 2021. "Routine or Rare Activity? A Quantitative Assessment of Parliamentary Scrutiny in the European Semester," Politics and Governance, Cogitatio Press, vol. 9(3), pages 112-123.
    5. Gräbner-Radkowitsch, Claudius & Hager, Theresa, 2021. "(Mis)measuring competitiveness: the quantification of a malleable concept in the European Semester," ZOE Discussion Papers 8, ZOE. institute for future-fit economies, Bonn.
    6. Federica Genovese & Gerald Schneider, 2020. "Smoke with fire: Financial crises and the demand for parliamentary oversight in the European Union," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 15(3), pages 633-665, July.

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