IDEAS home Printed from
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Ending Cooperation: A Formal Model of Organizational Change in German Pharmaceutical Interest Representation


  • Broscheid, Andreas


This paper uses a game theoretic model to investigate the 1993?94 split-up of the main German pharmaceutical association into an association for multinational, researchbased companies and an association representing small and medium-sized fi rms. In order to explain the breakdown of cooperation among group members, the paper employs a model that combines collective action and bargaining. The model suggests that changing issues can play an important role in organizational change. In the case of the German pharmaceutical industry, the key issue changed from pharmaceutical registration to cost control. With respect to the former issue, the different factions in the pharmaceutical industry had complementary interests and were able to fi nd a compromise position. The latter issue led to a confl ict over the redistribution of scarce resources between the factions; formally, this meant that all issue dimensions were equally important to all factions. As a result, it became impossible to realize policy gains through a political compromise.

Suggested Citation

  • Broscheid, Andreas, 2005. "Ending Cooperation: A Formal Model of Organizational Change in German Pharmaceutical Interest Representation," MPIfG Discussion Paper 05/9, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:mpifgd:059

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL:
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    1. repec:cup:apsrev:v:82:y:1988:i:04:p:1245-1260_19 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Nigel Gilbert & Andreas Pyka & Petra Ahrweiler, 2001. "Innovation Networks - a Simulation Approach," Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, vol. 4(3), pages 1-8.
    3. Timur Kuran, 1989. "Sparks and prairie fires: A theory of unanticipated political revolution," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 61(1), pages 41-74, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item


    Access and download statistics


    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:mpifgd:059. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (ZBW - German National Library of Economics). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.