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To fight or not to fight? An analysis of submission, struggle, and the design of contests

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  • Körber, Achim
  • Kolmar, Martin

Abstract

This paper considers the players' behaviour in an asymmetric two-player contest. When do they decide to "struggle" and when to "subjugate"? Analysing contest-success functions it is found that two crucial prerequisites for "struggle" or "war" have to be met. Thus, such an equilibrium is possible but restrictive. If a self-interested rule-setter chooses the contest-success function endogenously we show that one player will always subjugate. Applications to rent-seeking and environmental regulation are discussed.

Suggested Citation

  • Körber, Achim & Kolmar, Martin, 1996. "To fight or not to fight? An analysis of submission, struggle, and the design of contests," Discussion Papers, Series II 301, University of Konstanz, Collaborative Research Centre (SFB) 178 "Internationalization of the Economy".
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:kondp2:301
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    7. Elie Appelbaum & Eliakim Katz, 1986. "Transfer seeking and avoidance: On the full social costs of rent seeking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 48(2), pages 175-181, January.
    8. Maloney, Michael T & McCormick, Robert E, 1982. "A Positive Theory of Environmental Quality Regulation," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 25(1), pages 99-123, April.
    9. Nitzan, Shmuel, 1994. "Modelling rent-seeking contests," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 41-60, May.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Bös, Dieter, 2002. "Contests Among Bureaucrats," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 27/2002, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).
    2. Bos, Dieter & Kolmar, Martin, 2003. "Anarchy, efficiency, and redistribution," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(11), pages 2431-2457, October.
    3. Dieter Boes & Martin Kolmar, 2000. "Self-Correcting Mechanisms in Public Procurement: Why Award and Contract Should be Separated," CESifo Working Paper Series 302, CESifo.
    4. Bös, Dieter & Kolmar, Martin, 2000. "Self-Correcting Mechanisms in Public Procurement: Why Award and Contract Should be Separated," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 5/2000, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).
    5. Dieter Bös, 2004. "Contests Among Bureaucrats," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 119(3_4), pages 359-380, June.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Lobbying; Contest;

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
    • L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies

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