IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/zbw/ifwkwp/447.html

Burn the forest!: A bargaining theoretic analysis of a seemingly perverse proposal to protect the rainforest

Author

Listed:
  • Mohr, Ernst

Abstract

Consider a country possessing a specific production factor in fixed quantity, producing in combination with land a stream of services through time. Some of these services are consumed domestically. The bulk of it, however, is consumed world-wide. Despite the services the country provides to the world it does not earn any income from these exports. This is because it lacks a technology turning services produced into the exclusive property of the country. Possessing a sector which produces such a good, how can the country earn income from the services it provides? This is a stylised description of the problem faced by countries which host the world's rainforests. As determinants of the global climate rainforests provide a multitude of environmental services. Some of these services escape the home countries of forests, spill over abroad and are consumed there as a free lunch. In this sense, countries do not possess exclusive property rights over the forests they host. This global commonality of a national production factor creates a series of problems which endangers the environment.

Suggested Citation

  • Mohr, Ernst, 1990. "Burn the forest!: A bargaining theoretic analysis of a seemingly perverse proposal to protect the rainforest," Kiel Working Papers 447, Kiel Institute for the World Economy.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:ifwkwp:447
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/46968/1/256316058.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
    2. Fernandez, R. & Rosenthal, R.W., 1988. "Sovereign-Debt Renegotiations: A Strtegic Analysis," Papers 85, Boston University - Center for Latin American Development Studies.
    3. John Sutton, 1986. "Non-Cooperative Bargaining Theory: An Introduction," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 53(5), pages 709-724.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Klodt, Henning, 1990. "Government support for restructuring the East German economy," Kiel Working Papers 450, Kiel Institute for the World Economy.
    2. Mohr, Ernst, 1993. "Sustainable development and international distribution: Theory and application to rainforests as carbon sinks," Kiel Working Papers 602, Kiel Institute for the World Economy.
    3. Deke, Oliver, 2004. "Financing National Protected Area Networks Internationally: The Global Environment Facility as a Multilateral Mechanism of Transfer," Kiel Working Papers 1227, Kiel Institute for the World Economy.
    4. Deke, Oliver, 2004. "Internalizing Global Externalities from Biodiversity: Protected Areas and Multilateral Mechanisms of Transfer," Kiel Working Papers 1226, Kiel Institute for the World Economy.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Mohr, Ernst, 1990. "Courts of appeal, bureaucracies and conditional project permits: The role of negotiating non-exclusive property rights over the environment," Kiel Working Papers 408, Kiel Institute for the World Economy.
    2. Américo Mendes, 2005. "A Game Theoretical Model of Land Contract Choice," Game Theory and Information 0503001, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Gantner, Anita & Horn, Kristian & Kerschbamer, Rudolf, 2016. "Fair and efficient division through unanimity bargaining when claims are subjective," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 56-73.
    4. Élodie Bertrand, 2006. "La thèse d'efficience du « théorème de Coase ». Quelle critique de la microéconomie ?," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 57(5), pages 983-1007.
    5. Ray, Debraj & Vohra, Rajiv, 2015. "Coalition Formation," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,, Elsevier.
    6. Li, Duozhe, 2010. "A multilateral telephone bargaining game," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 108(1), pages 43-45, July.
    7. Rudolf Vetschera & Luis C. Dias, 2024. "Confidence and Outcome Expectations in Bilateral Negotiations–A Dynamic Model," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 33(4), pages 775-803, August.
    8. Haddad, L. & Kanbur, R., 1989. "Are Better Off Households More Unequal or Less Unequal? A Bargaining Theoritic Approach to "Kuznets Effects" at the Micro Level," Papers 99, Warwick - Development Economics Research Centre.
    9. Alejandro Caparrós & Jean-Christophe Péreau, 2017. "Multilateral versus sequential negotiations over climate change," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 69(2), pages 365-387.
    10. Bulow, Jeremy & Rogoff, Kenneth, 1989. "A Constant Recontracting Model of Sovereign Debt," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(1), pages 155-178, February.
    11. Ahmer Tarar, 2001. "International Bargaining with Two-Sided Domestic Constraints," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 45(3), pages 320-340, June.
    12. Robert Gibbons & John Roberts, 2012. "The Handbook of Organizational Economics," Economics Books, Princeton University Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 9889.
    13. Suchan Chae & Seho Kim, 2019. "The effects of third-party transfers in sequential anchored bargaining," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 48(1), pages 143-155, March.
    14. Rémy Delille & Jean-Christophe Pereau, 2014. "The Seawall Bargaining Game," Games, MDPI, vol. 5(2), pages 1-13, June.
    15. Cho, Seok-ju & Duggan, John, 2009. "Bargaining foundations of the median voter theorem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(2), pages 851-868, March.
    16. Rohan Pitchford & Mark L. J. Wright, 2012. "Holdouts in Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A Theory of Negotiation in a Weak Contractual Environment," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 79(2), pages 812-837.
    17. Luis C. Dias & Rudolf Vetschera, 2019. "Multiple local optima in Zeuthen–Hicks bargaining: an analysis of different preference models," EURO Journal on Decision Processes, Springer;EURO - The Association of European Operational Research Societies, vol. 7(1), pages 33-53, May.
    18. Sang-Chul Suh & Quan Wen, 2003. "Multi-Agent Bilateral Bargaining with Endogenous Protocol," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0305, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
    19. Yildirim, Huseyin, 2007. "Proposal power and majority rule in multilateral bargaining with costly recognition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 167-196, September.
    20. Usher, Dan, 2001. "Mysterious Bargaining," Queen's Economics Department Working Papers 273427, Queen's University - Department of Economics.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:ifwkwp:447. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/iwkiede.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.