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Sovereign-Debt Renegotiations: A Strtegic Analysis

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  • FERNANDEZ, R.
  • ROSENTHAL, R.W.

Abstract

The process of debt-rescheduling between a creditor and a sovereign (LDC) debtor is modeled as a noncooperative game built on a one-sector growth model. The creditor's threat to impose default penalties is ignored here as inherently incredible; instead, the debtor's motivation for repayment is to reap benefits from attaining an improved credit standing in international capital markets. The creditor can forgive portions of the outstanding debt so that a real-time bargaining process results with concessions being in the form of debt-service payments by the debtor and debt forgiveness by the creditor. Subgame-perfect equilibria of the game are characterized the main finding is that these all result in Pareto optima in which the creditor extracts all the surplus.
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Suggested Citation

  • Fernandez, R. & Rosenthal, R.W., 1988. "Sovereign-Debt Renegotiations: A Strtegic Analysis," Papers 85, Boston University - Center for Latin American Development Studies.
  • Handle: RePEc:fth:bostla:85
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Jonathan Eaton & Mark Gersovitz, 1981. "Debt with Potential Repudiation: Theoretical and Empirical Analysis," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 48(2), pages 289-309.
    2. Jeffrey Sachs, 1983. "Theoretical Issues in International Borrowing," NBER Working Papers 1189, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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    Cited by:

    1. Eaton, Jonathan & Fernandez, Raquel, 1995. "Sovereign debt," Handbook of International Economics,in: G. M. Grossman & K. Rogoff (ed.), Handbook of International Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 3, pages 2031-2077 Elsevier.
    2. Cole, Harold L & Dow, James & English, William B, 1995. "Default, Settlement, and Signalling: Lending Resumption in a Reputational Model of Sovereign Debt," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 36(2), pages 365-385, May.
    3. Cohen, Daniel*Verdier, Thierry, 1991. "Debt, debt relief, and growth : a bargaining approach," Policy Research Working Paper Series 762, The World Bank.
    4. Fernandez-Arias, Eduardo, 1991. "A dynamic bargaining model of sovereign debt," Policy Research Working Paper Series 778, The World Bank.
    5. Fernando Broner & Alberto Martin & Jaume Ventura, 2010. "Sovereign Risk and Secondary Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(4), pages 1523-1555, September.
    6. Fernandez, Raquel & Glazer, Jacob, 1990. "The scope for collusive behavior among debtor countries," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 297-313, April.
    7. Raquel Fernandez & Robert W. Rosenthal, 1989. "Sovereign-Debt Renegotiations Revisted," NBER Working Papers 2981, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Kletzer, Kenneth, 1989. "Inefficient Private Renegotiation of Sovereign Debt," CEPR Discussion Papers 357, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    9. Bester, Helmut, 1994. "The Role of Collateral in a Model of Debt Renegotiation," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 26(1), pages 72-86, February.
    10. Mark Gertler & Kenneth S. Rogoff, 1989. "Developing country borrowing and domestic wealth," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
    11. Diwan, Ishac & Verdier, Thierry, 1991. "Distributional aspects of debt adjustment," Policy Research Working Paper Series 657, The World Bank.
    12. Fernando Broner & Jaume Ventura, 2011. "Globalization and Risk Sharing," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 78(1), pages 49-82.
    13. Mohr, Ernst, 1990. "Burn the forest!: A bargaining theoretic analysis of a seemingly perverse proposal to protect the rainforest," Kiel Working Papers 447, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW).

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    Keywords

    debt ; indebtedness ; game theory ; debt repayment;

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