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Vertical integration, competition, and financial exchanges: Is there grain in the silo?

Author

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  • Juranek, Steffen
  • Walz, Uwe

Abstract

We investigate the incentives for vertical or horizontal integration in the financial security service industry, consisting of trading, clearing and settlement. We thereby focus on firms' decisions but also look on the implications of these decisions on competition and welfare. Our analysis shows that the incentives for vertical integration crucially depend on industry as well as market characteristics. A more pronounced demand for liquidity clearly favors vertical integration whereas deeper financial integration increases the incentives to undertake vertical integration only if the efficiency gains associated with vertical integration are sufficiently large. Furthermore, we show that market forces can suffer from a coordination problem that end in vertically integrated structures that are not in the best interest of the firms. We believe this problem can be addressed by policy measures such as the TARGET2-Securities program. Furthermore, we use our framework to discuss major industry trends and policy initiatives.

Suggested Citation

  • Juranek, Steffen & Walz, Uwe, 2010. "Vertical integration, competition, and financial exchanges: Is there grain in the silo?," CFS Working Paper Series 2010/22, Center for Financial Studies (CFS).
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:cfswop:201022
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    File URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/43226/1/641476019.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Thierry Foucault & Christine A. Parlour, 2004. "Competition for Listings," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 35(2), pages 329-355, Summer.
    2. Kauko, Karlo, 2004. "The links between securities settlement systems: An oligopoly theoretic approach," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 13(5), pages 585-600.
    3. Bulow, Jeremy I & Geanakoplos, John D & Klemperer, Paul D, 1985. "Multimarket Oligopoly: Strategic Substitutes and Complements," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(3), pages 488-511, June.
    4. Tapking, Jens & Yang, Jing, 2006. "Horizontal and Vertical Integration in Securities Trading and Settlement," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 38(7), pages 1765-1795, October.
    5. Koppl, Thorsten V. & Monnet, Cyril, 2007. "Guess what: It's the settlements! Vertical integration as a barrier to efficient exchange consolidation," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 31(10), pages 3013-3033, October.
    6. Holthausen, Cornelia & Tapking, Jens, 2007. "Raising rival's costs in the securities settlement industry," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 91-116, January.
    7. Jean Tirole, 1988. "The Theory of Industrial Organization," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262200716, January.
    8. Terrence Hendershott & Charles M. Jones & Albert J. Menkveld, 2011. "Does Algorithmic Trading Improve Liquidity?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 66(1), pages 1-33, February.
    9. Michael Halling & Marco Pagano & Otto Randl & Josef Zechner, 2008. "Where Is the Market? Evidence from Cross-Listings in the United States," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 21(2), pages 725-761, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Li, Shaofang & MarinĨ, Matej, 2016. "Competition in the clearing and settlement industry," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 134-162.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Vertical Integration; Horizontal Integration; Competition; Trading; Settlement;

    JEL classification:

    • G15 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - International Financial Markets
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure

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