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How important are abstainers in presidential elections? A comparative analysis between Africa and Latin America

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  • Henning, Christian H. C. A.
  • Diaz, Daniel
  • Lendewig, Andrea
  • Petri, Svetlana

Abstract

Even in countries with well functioning democracies, not all people with the right to vote in a presidential election decide to cast a vote. In order to study the importance of abstention in presidential elections in Africa and Latin America, data from Senegal and Honduras was analyzed. These countries have experienced a decline in the voter turnout over the past elections, which means that the party systems are somehow failing to engage voters in recent years. The purpose of this paper is to understand how people choose a certain party or candidate, as well as, how they decide to either vote or abstain. Moreover, we are looking to determine whether non-voters could motivate the governments to design and implement efficient policies. To achieve this, we estimated nested multinomial logit models including the alternative Abstention. Then, to evaluate government performance, we derived indicators for accountability and capture. Also, to determine the optimal policy positions for the governmental parties, First Order Condition (FOC) and Second Order Condition (SOC) were estimated for different issues.

Suggested Citation

  • Henning, Christian H. C. A. & Diaz, Daniel & Lendewig, Andrea & Petri, Svetlana, 2020. "How important are abstainers in presidential elections? A comparative analysis between Africa and Latin America," Working Papers of Agricultural Policy WP2020-13, University of Kiel, Department of Agricultural Economics, Chair of Agricultural Policy.
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:cauapw:wp202013
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    probabilistic voter model; capture; accountability; agricultural policy; Africa; Latin America;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • Q18 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Agricultural Policy; Food Policy; Animal Welfare Policy
    • C31 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables - - - Cross-Sectional Models; Spatial Models; Treatment Effect Models; Quantile Regressions; Social Interaction Models
    • C35 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables - - - Discrete Regression and Qualitative Choice Models; Discrete Regressors; Proportions
    • C38 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables - - - Classification Methdos; Cluster Analysis; Principal Components; Factor Analysis

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