IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/zbw/arqudp/314430.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Corporate tax planning and enforcement

Author

Listed:
  • Dyck, Daniel

Abstract

This study investigates how strategic interactions between corporate tax planning and tax enforcement are affected by two policy instruments: strengthening tax enforcement by increasing the number of specialized enforcement staff and improving tax audit technologies. I employ an economic model with a board of director's investment in a Tax Control Framework (TCF) and a tax manager's tax planning effort jointly shaping corporate tax planning and a tax auditor's technology-based audit decision. I show that the board only invests in the TCF when the enforcement environment is sufficiently strict, because it trades-off the costs and benefits of tax planning. Since strengthening tax enforcement decreases tax planning effort, the result can be less investment in a TCF in a strict enforcement environment, implying that TCF investment and enforcement can be strategic substitutes. Strikingly, I identify conditions under which improvements in tax audit technology increase corporate tax planning and impair tax audit efficiency, due to a crowding out of audit incentives. This result contradicts the view that improving audit technologies is universally effective, particularly in tax authorities with adequate staffing.

Suggested Citation

  • Dyck, Daniel, 2025. "Corporate tax planning and enforcement," arqus Discussion Papers in Quantitative Tax Research 290, arqus - Arbeitskreis Quantitative Steuerlehre.
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:arqudp:314430
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/314430/1/1920828826.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Belnap, Andrew & Hoopes, Jeffrey L. & Wilde, Jaron H., 2024. "Who really matters in corporate tax?," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(1).
    2. Armstrong, Christopher S. & Blouin, Jennifer L. & Larcker, David F., 2012. "The incentives for tax planning," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 391-411.
    3. Crocker, Keith J. & Slemrod, Joel, 2005. "Corporate tax evasion with agency costs," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(9-10), pages 1593-1610, September.
    4. Graetz, Michael J & Reinganum, Jennifer F & Wilde, Louis L, 1986. "The Tax Compliance Game: Toward an Interactive Theory of Law Enforcement," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 2(1), pages 1-32, Spring.
    5. Casi, Elisa & Spengel, Christoph & Stage, Barbara M.B., 2020. "Cross-border tax evasion after the common reporting standard: Game over?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 190(C).
    6. Shibano, T, 1990. "Assessing Audit Risk From Errors And Irregularities," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28, pages 110-140.
    7. Kohlhase, Saskia & Wielhouwer, Jacco L., 2023. "Tax and tariff planning through transfer prices: The role of the head office and business unit," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(2).
    8. Benjamin C. Ayers & Jeri K. Seidman & Erin M. Towery, 2019. "Tax Reporting Behavior Under Audit Certainty," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 36(1), pages 326-358, March.
    9. Wunder, Haroldene F., 2009. "Tax risk management and the multinational enterprise," Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 14-28.
    10. Armstrong, Christopher S. & Blouin, Jennifer L. & Jagolinzer, Alan D. & Larcker, David F., 2015. "Corporate governance, incentives, and tax avoidance," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 1-17.
    11. Preetika Joshi, 2020. "Does Private Country‐by‐Country Reporting Deter Tax Avoidance and Income Shifting? Evidence from BEPS Action Item 13," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(2), pages 333-381, May.
    12. Andrew Belnap & Jeffrey L. Hoopes & Edward L. Maydew & Alex Turk, 2024. "Real effects of tax audits," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 29(1), pages 665-700, March.
    13. Patterson, Er, 1993. "Strategic Sample-Size Choice In Auditing," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 31(2), pages 272-293.
    14. Gallemore, John & Labro, Eva, 2015. "The importance of the internal information environment for tax avoidance," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 149-167.
    15. Schantl, Stefan F. & Wagenhofer, Alfred, 2020. "Deterrence of financial misreporting when public and private enforcement strategically interact," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(1).
    16. Kay Blaufus & Jens Robert Schöndube & Stefan Wielenberg, 2024. "Information Sharing between Tax and Statutory Auditors: Implications for Tax Audit Efficiency," European Accounting Review, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 33(2), pages 545-568, March.
    17. Kong-Pin & C.Y. Cyrus Chu, 2005. "Internal Control versus External Manipulation: A Model of Corporate Income Tax Evasion," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 36(1), pages 151-164, Spring.
    18. Zackery D. Fox & Ryan Wilson, 2023. "Double trouble? IRS’s attention to financial accounting restatements," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 28(4), pages 2002-2038, December.
    19. Laux, Volker & Stocken, Phillip C., 2018. "Accounting standards, regulatory enforcement, and innovation," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 221-236.
    20. Hanlon, Michelle & Heitzman, Shane, 2010. "A review of tax research," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(2-3), pages 127-178, December.
    21. Stevanie S. Neuman & Thomas C. Omer & Andrew P. Schmidt, 2020. "Assessing Tax Risk: Practitioner Perspectives," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 37(3), pages 1788-1827, September.
    22. Jost H. Heckemeyer & Michael Overesch, 2017. "Multinationals’ profit response to tax differentials: Effect size and shifting channels," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 50(4), pages 965-994, November.
    23. Kong-Pin Chen & C.Y. Cyrus Chu, 2005. "Internal Control vs. External Manipulation: A Model of Corporate Income Tax Evasion," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 36(4), pages 151-164, Winter.
    24. Jennifer Blouin, 2014. "Defining and Measuring Tax Planning Aggressiveness," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association;National Tax Journal, vol. 67(4), pages 875-900, December.
    25. Ralf Ewert & Alfred Wagenhofer, 2019. "Effects of Increasing Enforcement on Financial Reporting Quality and Audit Quality," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 57(1), pages 121-168, March.
    26. Kenneth J. Klassen & Petro Lisowsky & Devan Mescall, 2017. "Transfer Pricing: Strategies, Practices, and Tax Minimization," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 34(1), pages 455-493, March.
    27. Michael P. Donohoe & Gary A. McGill & Edmund Outslay, 2014. "Risky Business: The Prosopography of Corporate Tax Planning," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association;National Tax Journal, vol. 67(4), pages 851-874, December.
    28. Jost H. Heckemeyer & Michael Overesch, 2017. "Multinationals profit response to tax differentials: Effect size and shifting channels," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 50(4), pages 965-994, November.
    29. Kay Blaufus & Jakob Reineke & Ilko Trenn, 2023. "Perceived tax audit aggressiveness, tax control frameworks and tax planning: an empirical analysis," Journal of Business Economics, Springer, vol. 93(3), pages 509-557, April.
    30. Anja de Waegenaere & Richard Sansing & Jacco L. Wielhouwer, 2015. "Financial Accounting Effects of Tax Aggressiveness: Contracting and Measurement," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 32(1), pages 223-242, March.
    31. Dane M. Christensen & David G. Kenchington & Rick C. Laux, 2022. "How do most low ETR firms avoid paying taxes?," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 27(2), pages 570-606, June.
    32. Armstrong, Christopher S. & Blouin, Jennifer L. & Jagolinzer, Alan D. & Larcker, David F., 2015. "Corporate Governance, Incentives, and Tax Avoidance," Research Papers 2134, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Fangjun Wang & Shuolei Xu & Junqin Sun & Charles P. Cullinan, 2020. "Corporate Tax Avoidance: A Literature Review And Research Agenda," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 34(4), pages 793-811, September.
    2. Giese, Henning & Koch, Reinald & Sureth, Caren, 2024. "Where to locate tax employees? The role of tax complexity and tax risk implications," arqus Discussion Papers in Quantitative Tax Research 285, arqus - Arbeitskreis Quantitative Steuerlehre.
    3. Melanie Steinhoff, 2015. "Management Compensation, Monitoring and Aggressive Corporate Tax Planning," CQE Working Papers 4115, Center for Quantitative Economics (CQE), University of Muenster.
    4. Steinhoff, Melanie, 2015. "Management compensation, monitoring and aggressive corporate tax planning," CAWM Discussion Papers 83, University of Münster, Münster Center for Economic Policy (MEP).
    5. Arfah Habib Saragih & Syaiful Ali, 2023. "Corporate tax risk: a literature review and future research directions," Management Review Quarterly, Springer, vol. 73(2), pages 527-577, June.
    6. Dyck, Daniel & Lorenz, Johannes & Sureth, Caren, 2022. "How do tax technology and controversy expertise affect tax disputes?," arqus Discussion Papers in Quantitative Tax Research 274, arqus - Arbeitskreis Quantitative Steuerlehre.
    7. Roman Lanis & Grant Richardson & Chelsea Liu & Ross McClure, 2019. "The Impact of Corporate Tax Avoidance on Board of Directors and CEO Reputation," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 160(2), pages 463-498, December.
    8. McClure, Ross & Lanis, Roman & Wells, Peter & Govendir, Brett, 2018. "The impact of dividend imputation on corporate tax avoidance: The case of shareholder value," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 492-514.
    9. Martin Jacob & Anna Rohlfing-Bastian & Kai Sandner, 2021. "Why do not all firms engage in tax avoidance?," Review of Managerial Science, Springer, vol. 15(2), pages 459-495, February.
    10. Kovermann, Jost & Velte, Patrick, 2019. "The impact of corporate governance on corporate tax avoidance—A literature review," Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation, Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 1-1.
    11. Sven-Eric Bärsch & Jost Heckemeyer & Marcel Olbert, 2023. "Do firms with a centralized transfer pricing authority have more tax disputes and internal coordination conflicts?," Journal of Business Economics, Springer, vol. 93(8), pages 1415-1450, October.
    12. Hasan, Mostafa Monzur & Lobo, Gerald J. & Qiu, Buhui, 2021. "Organizational capital, corporate tax avoidance, and firm value," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 70(C).
    13. Mostafa Monzur Hasan & Ahsan Habib & Nurul Alam, 2021. "Asset Redeployability and Corporate Tax Avoidance," Abacus, Accounting Foundation, University of Sydney, vol. 57(2), pages 183-219, June.
    14. Jinshuai Hu & Siqi Li & Terry Shevlin, 2023. "How does the market for corporate control impact tax avoidance? Evidence from international M&A laws," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 28(1), pages 340-383, March.
    15. Giese, Henning & Koch, Reinald & Gamm, Markus, 2022. "Tax avoidance and vertical interlocks within multinational enterprises," arqus Discussion Papers in Quantitative Tax Research 270, arqus - Arbeitskreis Quantitative Steuerlehre.
    16. Guangyong Lei & Wanwan Wang & Junli Yu & Kam C. Chan, 2022. "Cultural Diversity and Corporate Tax Avoidance: Evidence from Chinese Private Enterprises," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 176(2), pages 357-379, March.
    17. Armstrong, Christopher S. & Blouin, Jennifer L. & Jagolinzer, Alan D. & Larcker, David F., 2015. "Corporate governance, incentives, and tax avoidance," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 1-17.
    18. Wei Huang & Tingting Ying & Yun Shen, 2018. "Executive cash compensation and tax aggressiveness of Chinese firms," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 51(4), pages 1151-1180, November.
    19. Wenzhou Qu & Shaoqing Kang & Lihong Wang, 2020. "Saving or tunnelling: value effects of tax avoidance in Chinese listed local government‐controlled firms," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 60(5), pages 4421-4465, December.
    20. Katarzyna Bilicka & André Seidel, 2020. "Profit shifting and corruption," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 27(5), pages 1051-1080, October.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    tax control framework; tax planning; tax risk management; tax audit technology; tax enforcement;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
    • H32 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - Firm
    • M42 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - Auditing
    • M48 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:arqudp:314430. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.arqus.info/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.