False Consensus in Economic Agents
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More about this item
- D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
- C83 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Data Collection and Data Estimation Methodology; Computer Programs - - - Survey Methods; Sampling Methods
- D84 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Expectations; Speculations
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-09-16 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2011-09-16 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2011-09-16 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-NEU-2011-09-16 (Neuroeconomics)
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