A New Analysis of A Priori Voting Power in the IMF: Recent Quota Reforms Give Little Cause for Celebration
The weighted voting system used by the International Monetary Fund creates problems of democratic legitimacy since each member's influence or voting power is not in general equal to its voting weight. Using voting power analysis to analyse both the Board of Governors and the Executive Board, we show that it tends to enhance the power of the United States at the expense of all other members. We investigate the constituency system as a form of representative democracy, idealizing it as a compound voting body, and find that it gives disproportionately large power to some smaller European countries, particularly Belgium and Netherlands. We also find that many countries are effectively disenfranchised. Separate analyses are done for 2006 and 2012, before and after recent reforms, which have been billed as being radical, enhancing the voice of the poor and emerging markets, but the effects are disappointingly small.
|Date of creation:||2012|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: CV4 7AL COVENTRY|
Phone: +44 (0) 2476 523202
Fax: +44 (0) 2476 523032
Web page: http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Dennis Leech & Robert Leech, 2006.
"Voting power and voting blocs,"
Springer, vol. 127(3), pages 285-303, June.
- Leech, Dennis & Leech, Robert, 2004. "Voting Power and Voting Blocs," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 716, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- Dennis Leech, 2003. "Computing Power Indices for Large Voting Games," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 49(6), pages 831-837, June.
- Dan S. Felsenthal & Moshé Machover, 1998. "The Measurement of Voting Power," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 1489, July. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wrk:warwec:1001. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Margaret Nash)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.