Telecommunications Reform in the United States: Promises and Pitfalls
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Note: Type of Document - WordPerfect; prepared on IBM PC ; to print on HP Laserjet III; pages: 50 ; figures: none. The views in this paper do not purport to represent those of any United States government agency. I have learned a lot from discussions with Tim Brennan, Gerald Brock, Richard Clarke, Bill Corbett, Robert Crandall, Tom Hazlett, Evan Kwerel, Roger Noll, George Slover, Lisa Sockett, Joe Stiglitz, Jean Tirole, Scott Wallsten, Leonard Waverman, John Windhausen, Peyton Wynns and many others. I wish I could blame them for any errors, but unfortunately must take full responsibility. Telecommunications and Energy in Systemic Transformation: International Dynamics, Deregulation and Adjustment in Network Industries Paul J.J. Welfens and George Yarrow, Eds., 1996, forthcoming, Heidelberg and New York: Springer
Download full text from publisher
Other versions of this item:
- Marius Schwartz, 1996. "Telecommunications Reform in the United States: Promises and Pitfalls," Industrial Organization 9607001, University Library of Munich, Germany.
References listed on IDEAS
- Schwartz, Marius, 1986. "The Nature and Scope of Contestability Theory," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 38(0), pages 37-57, Suppl. No.
- Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1993. "A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262121743, December.
- Peter Cramton, 2002. "Spectrum Auctions," Papers of Peter Cramton 01hte, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 16 Jul 2001.
- Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1996. "Creating Competition through Interconnection: Theory and Practice," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 10(3), pages 227-256, November.
- Tirole, Jean, 1986.
"Procurement and Renegotiation,"
Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(2), pages 235-259, April.
- Jean Tirole, 1985. "Procurement and Renegotiation," Working papers 362, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- Ku, Hyeon-Mo & Kim, Jae-Cheol, 1998. "Non-discriminatory access pricing for multiple entrants," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 173-183.
- Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Rey, Patrick & Tirole, Jean, 1997. "Competition between telecommunications operators," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 41(3-5), pages 701-711, April.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Buehler, Stefan & Schmutzler, Armin & Benz, Men-Andri, 2004.
"Infrastructure quality in deregulated industries: is there an underinvestment problem?,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 253-267, February.
- Stefan Buehler & Armin Schmutzler & Men-Andri Benz, 2002. "Infrastructure Quality in Deregulated Industries: Is there an Underinvestment Problem?," SOI - Working Papers 0209, Socioeconomic Institute - University of Zurich.
- Schmutzler, Armin & Benz, Men-Andri & Bühler, Stefan, 2003. "Infrastructure Quality in Deregulated Industries: Is there an Underinvestment Problem?," CEPR Discussion Papers 3836, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Drew Fudenberg, 2015.
"Tirole's Industrial Regulation and Organization Legacy in Economics,"
Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 117(3), pages 771-800, July.
- Fudenberg, Drew, 2015. "Tirole's Industrial Regulation and Organization Legacy in Economics," Scholarly Articles 27303657, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Nobel Prize Committee, 2014. "Market power and regulation (scientific background)," Nobel Prize in Economics documents 2014-2, Nobel Prize Committee.
- Marcel Boyer & Jacques Robert, 1997. "Competition and Access in Electricity Markets: ECPR, Global Price Cap, and Auctions," CIRANO Working Papers 97s-41, CIRANO.
- Marcel Boyer, 1997. "Competition and Access in Telecoms: ECPR, Global Price Cap, and Auctions," CIRANO Working Papers 97s-03, CIRANO.
- Armstrong, Mark & Sappington, David E.M., 2007. "Recent Developments in the Theory of Regulation," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: Mark Armstrong & Robert Porter (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 27, pages 1557-1700, Elsevier.
- Bassanini, Anna & Pouyet, Jerome, 2005.
"Strategic choice of financing systems in regulated and interconnected industries,"
Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(2-3), pages 233-259, February.
- BASSANINI, Anna & POUYET, Jérôme, 2002. "Strategic choice of financing systems in regulated and interconnected industries," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2002017, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Pouyet, Jérôme & Bassanini, Anna, 2003. "Strategic Choice of Financing Systems in Regulated and Interconnected Industries," CEPR Discussion Papers 3888, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Anna Bassanini & Jérôme Pouyet, 2004. "Strategic Choice of Financing Systems in Regulated and Interconnected Industries," Working Papers 2004-08, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
- Philippe Choné & Laurent Flochel & Anne Perrot, 1999.
"Allocating and Funding Universal Service Obligations in a Competitive Network Market,"
Working Papers
99-55, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
- Philippe Chone & Laurent Flochel & Anne Perrot, 2000. "Allocating and Funding Universal Service Obligations in a Competitive Network Market," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0213, Econometric Society.
- Gonzalez, P., 1999.
"Specific Investment, Absence of Commitment and Observability,"
Papers
99-03, Laval - Recherche en Energie.
- González, Patrick, 1999. "Specific Investment, Absence of Commitment and Observability," Cahiers de recherche 9902, Université Laval - Département d'économique.
- Patrick González, 1999. "Specific Investment, Absence of Commitment and Observability," CIRANO Working Papers 99s-06, CIRANO.
- François MARECHAL, 2003. "Should we base procurement rules on the competition of linear incentive contracts ?," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie 03.07, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie.
- Patrick Gonzàlez, 2004.
"Investment and Screening Under Asymmetric Endogenous Information,"
RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 35(3), pages 502-519, Autumn.
- González, Patrick, 2002. "Investment and Screening under Asymmetric Endogenous Information," Cahiers de recherche 0204, Université Laval - Département d'économique.
- Gonzalez, Patrick, 2002. "Investment and Screening under Asymmetric Endogenous Information," Cahiers de recherche 0201, GREEN.
- Marius BRÜLHART & Federico TRIONFETTI, 2000.
"Public Expenditure and International Specialisation,"
Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie
00.23, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie.
- Brülhart, Marius & Trionfetti, Federico, 2001. "Public expenditure and international specialisation," HWWA Discussion Papers 141, Hamburg Institute of International Economics (HWWA).
- Brulhart, Marius & Trionfetti, Federico, 2001. "Public Expenditure and International Specialisation," Discussion Paper Series 26299, Hamburg Institute of International Economics.
- Chiara D'Alpaos & Cesare Dosi & Michele Moretto, 2005.
"Concession lenght and investment timing flexibility,"
Working Papers
ubs0502, University of Brescia, Department of Economics.
- Michele Moretto & Chiara D.Alpaos & Cesare Dosi, 2005. "Concession Length and Investment Timing Flexibility," Working Papers 2005.32, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Bester, Helmut & Strausz, Roland, 2007.
"Contracting with imperfect commitment and noisy communication,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 236-259, September.
- Helmut Bester & Roland Strausz, "undated". "Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and Noisy Communication," Papers 017, Departmental Working Papers.
- Bester, Helmut & Strausz, Roland, 2003. "Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and Noisy Communication," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 2, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Massey, Patrick, 2004.
"Is Irish Utility Regulation Failing Consumers?,"
Quarterly Economic Commentary: Special Articles, Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI), vol. 2004(4-Winter), pages 1-18.
- Patrick Massey, 2004. "Is Irish Utility Regulation Failing Consumers?," Economics Department Working Paper Series n1451104, Department of Economics, National University of Ireland - Maynooth.
- Quintero Jaramillo, Jose E., 2004. "Liquidity constraints and credit subsidies in auctions," DEE - Working Papers. Business Economics. WB wb040604, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de EconomÃa de la Empresa.
- Philippe Aghion & Richard Blundell & Rachel Griffith & Peter Howitt & Susanne Prantl, 2009.
"The Effects of Entry on Incumbent Innovation and Productivity,"
The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 91(1), pages 20-32, February.
- Blundell, Richard & Howitt, Peter & Aghion, Philippe & Griffith, Rachel & Prantl, Susanne, 2005. "The Effects of Entry on Incumbent Innovation and Productivity," CEPR Discussion Papers 5323, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Richard, Blundell & Rachel, Griffith & Peter, Howitt & Susanne, Prantl & Aghion, Philippe, 2009. "The Effects of Entry on Incumbent Innovation and Productivity," Scholarly Articles 4554222, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Philippe Aghion & Richard Blundell & Rachel Griffith & Peter Howitt & Susanne Prantl, 2006. "The Effects of Entry on Incumbent Innovation and Productivity," NBER Working Papers 12027, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Aghion, Philippe & Blundell, Richard & Griffith, Rachel & Howitt, Peter & Prantl, Susanne, 2006. "The effects of entry on incumbent innovation and productivity," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Competition and Innovation SP II 2006-18, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
- Levine, Paul & Rickman, Neil, 2002.
"Price Regulation, Investment and the Commitment Problem,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
3200, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Paul Levine & Neil Rickman, 2003. "Price Regulation, Investment and the Commitment Problem," School of Economics Discussion Papers 0603, School of Economics, University of Surrey.
- Paul Joskow & Jean Tirole, 2005.
"Merchant Transmission Investment,"
Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(2), pages 233-264, June.
- Paul Joskow & Jean Tirole, 2003. "Merchant Transmission Investment," Working Papers 0304, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research.
- Joskow, P. & Tirole, J., 2003. "Merchant Transmission Investment," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0324, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
- Paul Joskow & Jean Tirole, 2003. "Merchant Transmission Investment," Working Papers EP24, Energy Policy Research Group, Cambridge Judge Business School, University of Cambridge.
- Joskow, Paul L. & Tirole, Jean, 2004. "Merchant Transmission Investment," IDEI Working Papers 263, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- Paul Joskow & Jean Tirole, 2003. "Merchant Transmission Investment," NBER Working Papers 9534, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Eduardo Engel & Ronald Fischer & Alexander Galetovic, 2002.
"Competition in or for The Field: Which is Better?,"
Documentos de Trabajo
115, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
- Eduardo Engel & Ronald Fischer & Alexander Galetovic, 2002. "Competition In or For the Field: Which Is Better?," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1358, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Jul 2007.
- Eduardo Engel & Ronald Fischer & Alexander Galetovic, 2002. "Competition in or for the Field: Which is Better?," NBER Working Papers 8869, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Eduardo Engel & Ronald Fischer & Alexander Galetovic, 2002. "Competition In or For the Field: Which is Better," Working Papers 844, Economic Growth Center, Yale University.
- Engel, Eduardo M.R.A. & Fischer, Ronald & Galetovic, Alexander, 2002. "Competition In or For the Field: Which Is Better?," Center Discussion Papers 28406, Yale University, Economic Growth Center.
More about this item
Keywords
;JEL classification:
- L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
- C81 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Data Collection and Data Estimation Methodology; Computer Programs - - - Methodology for Collecting, Estimating, and Organizing Microeconomic Data; Data Access
- F49 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - Other
- R38 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Real Estate Markets, Spatial Production Analysis, and Firm Location - - - Government Policy
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpio:9706001. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: EconWPA The email address of this maintainer does not seem to be valid anymore. Please ask EconWPA to update the entry or send us the correct address (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://econwpa.ub.uni-muenchen.de .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.
Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/wpa/wuwpio/9706001.html