Trade Balance Constraints and Optimal Regulation
We investigate the interactions between optimal regulation and external credit constraints. When part of a regulated ¯rm is owned by foreign investors, a credit-constrained country who wants to send pro¯ts abroad has to generate enough surplus in the trade account in order to compensate capital out°ows. We show that the credit constraint translates into a constraint of maximum profits for the regulated firm. Overall e±ciency in the regulated sector is reduced to maintain incentive compatibility. A flexible exchange rate helps relaxing the credit constraint. E±ciency is higher than with a fixed exchange rate, but still lower than without credit constraints.
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