Little Firms and Big Patents: The Incentives To Disclose Competencies
This paper offers a theoretical treatment of information disclosure through patenting. We consider a signaling model in which two domestic firms disclose their competencies to a foreign firm. Conditions are discussed under which separating and pooling equilibria occur, together with a domination-based re-finement. Depending on the payoff situation of the foreign firm, separating and semi-separating equilibria occur in which the firm with the higher competencies discloses. We show that subsidizing the costs of patent applications has no impact on the outcome.
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