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A Note on Bank Behavior and Monetary Policies in an Oligopolistic Market

Author

Listed:
  • Shota Yamazaki

    (Graduate School of Economics, Keio University)

  • Hiroaki Miyamoto

    (Graduate School of Economics, Keio University)

Abstract

We extend Freixas and Rochet (1997) to two-stage game: In the first stage each bank simultaneously decides on amounts of deposits. Then each bank decides on loan amounts in the second stage. Each stage is a Cournot game in quantity. Scope economies between loans and deposits also arise explicitly in our model. We show that in the case where large economies of scope an increase in the interbank interest rate leads to an decrease in the interest rate on deposits and to an increase in the interest rate on loans.

Suggested Citation

  • Shota Yamazaki & Hiroaki Miyamoto, 2004. "A Note on Bank Behavior and Monetary Policies in an Oligopolistic Market," Industrial Organization 0408003, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpio:0408003
    Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 14
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    File URL: https://econwpa.ub.uni-muenchen.de/econ-wp/io/papers/0408/0408003.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Baumol, William J, 1982. "Contestable Markets: An Uprising in the Theory of Industry Structure," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(1), pages 1-15, March.
    2. James A. Brander & Barbara J. Spencer, 1983. "Strategic Commitment with R&D: The Symmetric Case," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(1), pages 225-235, Spring.
    3. Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean, 1984. "The Fat-Cat Effect, the Puppy-Dog Ploy, and the Lean and Hungry Look," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(2), pages 361-366, May.
    4. Bulow, Jeremy I & Geanakoplos, John D & Klemperer, Paul D, 1985. "Multimarket Oligopoly: Strategic Substitutes and Complements," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(3), pages 488-511, June.
    5. Xavier Freixas & Jean-Charles Rochet, 1997. "Microeconomics of Banking," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061937, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Eleni Dalla, 2017. "Monetary policy implications on the investment decision: Do economies of scope in the banking sector matter?," Discussion Paper Series 2017_05, Department of Economics, University of Macedonia, revised Mar 2017.
    2. Eleni Dalla, 2018. "On the effect of Cournot and Stackelberg competition in the banking sector on the investment cycle," International Journal of Monetary Economics and Finance, Inderscience Enterprises Ltd, vol. 11(5), pages 499-515.
    3. Eleni Dalla & Christos Karpetis & Erotokritos Varelas, 2014. "Monetary Policy Implications on Banking Conduct and Bank Clients’ Behavior," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 42(4), pages 427-440, December.
    4. dala, eleni & karpetis, christos & varelas, erotokritos, 2013. "Bank Behavior in Oligopoly, Bank- Clients and Monetary Policy," MPRA Paper 47483, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Dalla, Eleni & Varelas, Erotokritos, 2016. "An economic model for the interpretation of business cycles and the efficiency of monetary policy," The Journal of Economic Asymmetries, Elsevier, vol. 14(PA), pages 29-38.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bank behavior; Strategic effects; Monetary policies; Scope economies;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

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