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On the Relation Between Perfect Equilibria in Extensive Form Games and Proper Equilibria in Normal Form Games

  • John Hillas

    (SUNY at Stony Brook)

Registered author(s):

    This paper examines the question of the extent to which it is true that any equilibrium that is quasi-perfect in any extensive form game having a given normal form is necessarily proper. If one fixes not only the equilibrium in question but also a a sequence of completely mixed strategies converging to that equilibrium then indeed the notions are equivalent. However the stronger result is not true. An example of a normal form game is given in which there is an equilibrium that is quasi-perfect in any extensive form game having a given normal form but not proper.

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    File URL: http://128.118.178.162/eps/game/papers/9605/9605002.pdf
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    File URL: http://128.118.178.162/eps/game/papers/9605/9605002.ps.gz
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    Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Game Theory and Information with number 9605002.

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    Length: 1 pages
    Date of creation: 14 May 1996
    Date of revision: 14 May 1996
    Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9605002
    Note: Type of Document - AMSLaTeX2e; prepared on IBM PC - emTeX; to print on PostScript; pages: 1 + 9 ; figures: included
    Contact details of provider: Web page: http://128.118.178.162

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    1. David M Kreps & Robert Wilson, 2003. "Sequential Equilibria," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000813, David K. Levine.
    2. Mailath, G.J. & Samuelson, L., 1996. "How Proper Is Sequential Equilibrium?," Working papers 9611r, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
    3. E. Kohlberg & J.-F. Mertens, 1998. "On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria," Levine's Working Paper Archive 445, David K. Levine.
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