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Cooperative investment games or population games

Author

Listed:
  • Yaron Azrieli

    (Tel Aviv University)

  • Ehud Lehrer

    (Tel Aviv University)

Abstract

The model of a cooperative fuzzy game is interpreted as both a population game and a cooperative investment game. Three types of core- like solutions induced by these interpretations are introduced and investigated. The interpretation of a game as a population game allows us to define sub-games. We show that, unlike the well-known Shapley- Shubik theorem on market games (Shapley-Shubik) there might be a population game such that each of its sub-games has a non-empty core and, nevertheless, it is not a market game. It turns out that, in order to be a market game, a population game needs to be also homogeneous. We also discuss some special classes of population games such as convex games, exact games, homogeneousgames and additive games.

Suggested Citation

  • Yaron Azrieli & Ehud Lehrer, 2005. "Cooperative investment games or population games," Game Theory and Information 0503007, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0503007
    Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 30
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    File URL: https://econwpa.ub.uni-muenchen.de/econ-wp/game/papers/0503/0503007.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Shapley, Lloyd S. & Shubik, Martin, 1969. "On market games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 9-25, June.
    2. Brânzei, R. & Dimitrov, D.A. & Tijs, S.H., 2002. "Convex Fuzzy Games and Participation Monotonic Allocation Schemes," Discussion Paper 2002-13, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    3. Yaron Azrieli & Ehud Lehrer, 2004. "On Concavification and Convex Games," Game Theory and Information 0408002, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Elsner, Ludwig & van den Driessche, P, 2010. "Modifying the power method in max algebra," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 332, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
    5. Tsurumi, Masayo & Tanino, Tetsuzo & Inuiguchi, Masahiro, 2001. "A Shapley function on a class of cooperative fuzzy games," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 129(3), pages 596-618, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    investment game; population game; fuzzy game; core-like solution; market game;

    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty

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