Cooperative investment games or population games
The model of a cooperative fuzzy game is interpreted as both a population game and a cooperative investment game. Three types of core- like solutions induced by these interpretations are introduced and investigated. The interpretation of a game as a population game allows us to define sub-games. We show that, unlike the well-known Shapley- Shubik theorem on market games (Shapley-Shubik) there might be a population game such that each of its sub-games has a non-empty core and, nevertheless, it is not a market game. It turns out that, in order to be a market game, a population game needs to be also homogeneous. We also discuss some special classes of population games such as convex games, exact games, homogeneousgames and additive games.
References listed on IDEAS
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- Tsurumi, Masayo & Tanino, Tetsuzo & Inuiguchi, Masahiro, 2001. "A Shapley function on a class of cooperative fuzzy games," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 129(3), pages 596-618, March.
- Shapley, Lloyd S. & Shubik, Martin, 1969. "On market games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 9-25, June.
- Branzei,R. & Dimitrov,D. & Tijs,S., 2002.
"Convex fuzzy games and participation monotonic allocation schemes,"
Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers
332, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
- Brânzei, R. & Dimitrov, D.A. & Tijs, S.H., 2002. "Convex Fuzzy Games and Participation Monotonic Allocation Schemes," Discussion Paper 2002-13, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Brânzei, R. & Dimitrov, D.A. & Tijs, S.H., 2003. "Convex fuzzy games and participation monotonic allocation schemes," Other publications TiSEM fbae679e-d7f4-4601-a785-1, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Yaron Azrieli & Ehud Lehrer, 2004. "On Concavification and Convex Games," Game Theory and Information 0408002, EconWPA. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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