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Equilibrium Outcomes of Repeated Two-Person, Zero-Sum Games

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  • Guilherme Carmona

Abstract

We consider repeated two-person, zero-sum games in which the preferences in the repeated game depend on the stage-game preferences, although not necessarily in a time-consistent way. We assume that each player's repeated game payoff function at each period of time is strictly increasing on the stage game payoffs and that the repeated game is itself a zero-sum game in every period. Under these assumptions, we show that an outcome is a subgame perfect outcome if and only if all its components are Nash equilibria of the stage game.

Suggested Citation

  • Guilherme Carmona, 2004. "Equilibrium Outcomes of Repeated Two-Person, Zero-Sum Games," Game Theory and Information 0402003, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0402003
    Note: Type of Document - pdf; prepared on winxp; to print on general; pages: 14; figures: 1. none
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. R. H. Strotz, 1955. "Myopia and Inconsistency in Dynamic Utility Maximization," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 23(3), pages 165-180.
    2. Bezalel Peleg & Menahem E. Yaari, 1973. "On the Existence of a Consistent Course of Action when Tastes are Changing," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 40(3), pages 391-401.
    3. Steven M. Goldman, 1980. "Consistent Plans," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 47(3), pages 533-537.
    4. Narayana R. Kocherlakota, 2001. "Looking for evidence of time-inconsistent preferences in asset market data," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, vol. 25(Sum), pages 13-24.
    5. David Laibson, 1997. "Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 112(2), pages 443-478.
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    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

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