Do We Detect and Exploit Mixed Strategy Play by Opponents?
We conducted an experiment in which each subject repeatedly played a game with a unique Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies against some computer-implemented mixed strategy. The results indicate subjects are successful at detecting and exploiting deviations from Nash equilibrium. However, there is heterogeneity in subject behavior and performance. We present a one variable model of dynamic random belief formation which rationalizes observed heterogeneity and other features of the data.
|Date of creation:||04 Oct 2003|
|Date of revision:|
|Note:||Type of Document - PDF; prepared on IBM PC - PC-MSWORD; pages: 21 . We never published this piece and now we would like to reduce our mailing and xerox cost by posting it.|
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