Innovation in Financial Services, Relationships and Risk Sharing
Relationships between intermediaries and their customers have become increasingly important in recent years. This paper argues that the need for costly ex ante information acquisition and analysis is a major barrier to the participation of investors and firms in sophisticated markets. Long-term relationships between intermediaries and their customers, in which intermediaries provide implicit insurance to customers, can be an effective substitute for costly ex ante investigation. In this way, intermediaries allow firms and investors to reap the benefits of financial markets. Relationships are easiest to sustain when the ongoing benefits to both parties are high. As a result competition may lower the benefits that can be obtained from relationships. This paper was presented at the Financial Institutions Center's conference on Performance of Financial Institutions, May 8-10, 1997.
|Date of creation:|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Web page: http://fic.wharton.upenn.edu/fic/
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Diamond, Douglas W, 1984. "Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 51(3), pages 393-414, July.
- Gale, Douglas, 1992. "Standard Securities," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(4), pages 731-55, October.
- Dow, James & Werlang, Sergio Ribeiro da Costa, 1992. "Uncertainty Aversion, Risk Aversion, and the Optimal Choice of Portfolio," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(1), pages 197-204, January.
- Sharpe, Steven A, 1990.
" Asymmetric Information, Bank Lending, and Implicit Contracts: A Stylized Model of Customer Relationships,"
Journal of Finance,
American Finance Association, vol. 45(4), pages 1069-87, September.
- Steven A. Sharpe, 1989. "Asymmetric information, bank lending, and implicit contracts: a stylized model of customer relationships," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 70, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wop:pennin:97-26. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Thomas Krichel)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.