Do Consumers Pay for One-Stop Banking?

The authors use a specialized revenue function to estimate the revenue economies of scope and determine whether banks providing a broad mix of services are able to capitalize on the potential savings in transaction costs afforded their customers. Bank production costs and consumer consumption expenses are thought to be reduced through relationship banking strategies that cultivate one stop shopping for financial services. Much work has been done on estimates of production synergies that correspond to cost economies of scope. The complementarities in the consumption of bank services is potentially as important for bank profitability but it has yet to be examined in detail. Complementarities arise from reductions in user transaction and search costs associated with consuming financial services jointly from the same bank provider, often at the same location, rather than consuming these services separately from different providers at different locations. If benefits from joint consumption are strong, consumers should be willing to pay for them through higher prices at banks that provide services jointly rather than separately. The authors find no evidence of statistically significant revenue complementarities or fixed revenue effects among banks over 1978-1990. Revenues are no larger when deposits and loans are provided jointly rather than separately, and consumers do not pay for one stop banking. This holds for the average small or large bank as well as those on and off the revenue-efficient frontier. Combining revenue scope results with earlier cost scope findings suggests that synergies between bank deposits and loans are small and concentrated in joint production, rather than joint consumption. Consumers may or may not value one stop banking, but they apparently do not have to pay for it.