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Rule-Based Civil Service : Evidence from a Nationwide Teacher Reform in Mexico

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  • Bedoya,Juan
  • De Hoyos Navarro,Rafael E.
  • Estrada,Ricardo

Abstract

This paper studies the effect of a civil service reform on the skills profile of new teachers in Mexico. The reform mandated the use of rule-based recruitment over discretionary hiring. The results show that the reform led to hiring teachers with higher cognitive skills. The paper also shows that an improvement in the bottom of the skills distribution of new hires drove this change. Two channels explain these effects. First, the reform decreased the prevalence of discretionary hires, who tended to be drawn from the bottom of the skills distribution. Second, the reform improved the screening efficiency of rule-based hiring, making cognitive skills more important determinants of hiring outcomes.

Suggested Citation

  • Bedoya,Juan & De Hoyos Navarro,Rafael E. & Estrada,Ricardo, 2023. "Rule-Based Civil Service : Evidence from a Nationwide Teacher Reform in Mexico," Policy Research Working Paper Series 10540, The World Bank.
    • Handle: RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:10540
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