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Cost-Effectiveness, Insurance Solvency, and Health Capital: A Joint Incompatibility Theorem and Dynamic Research Programme

Author

Listed:
  • Jakub Ryłow

    (Faculty of Economic Sciences, University of Warsaw)

Abstract

This paper examines the mathematical architecture of health economics through four analytical traditions—Arrow’s welfare economics of medical care, Grossman’s health capital model, Garber’s cost-effectiveness analysis, and Zweifel’s actuarial insurance theory—and derives three original results. C1 (Joint Incompatibility Theorem): under empirically standard regularity conditions, no health system simultaneously satisfies the Garber–Phelps WTP-based cost-effectiveness criterion, Zweifel’s actuarial solvency condition under community rating, and the Pauly–Zweifel optimal coinsurance rule; the proof proceeds via three lemmas, each isolating a separate incompatibility. C2 (Dynamic Cost-Effectiveness Threshold): the cost-effectiveness threshold λ*(t) is derived as an endogenous co-state variable of a unified dynamic optimisation, and shown to equal the present value of future marginal health benefits discounted at the user cost of health capital ρ + δ(t). C3 (Demographic Suboptimality of Uniform Thresholds): as a corollary, uniform thresholds are dynamically inconsistent with any population whose age-specific depreciation rate is increasing, with the direction of the depreciation channel being theoretically determinate. Together, C1 converts a collection of separately noted tensions into a single structural result, while C2 and C3 convert that result into a constructive research programme for dynamic health economic evaluation.

Suggested Citation

  • Jakub Ryłow, 2026. "Cost-Effectiveness, Insurance Solvency, and Health Capital: A Joint Incompatibility Theorem and Dynamic Research Programme," Working Papers 2026-6, Faculty of Economic Sciences, University of Warsaw.
  • Handle: RePEc:war:wpaper:2026-6
    as

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    File URL: https://www.wne.uw.edu.pl/download_file/7112/4282
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Garber, Alan M. & Phelps, Charles E., 1997. "Economic foundations of cost-effectiveness analysis," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 1-31, February.
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    6. Zweifel, Peter & Manning, Willard G., 2000. "Moral hazard and consumer incentives in health care," Handbook of Health Economics, in: A. J. Culyer & J. P. Newhouse (ed.), Handbook of Health Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 8, pages 409-459, Elsevier.
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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
    • I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets
    • I13 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Health Insurance, Public and Private
    • C61 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies

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