Search, Applications and Vacancies
This paper examines a generalized rivalry problem in the labour market. It employs a simple labour supply model as a framework to analyse labour markets characterized by search with competition among searchers. First, the labour market process for new hires is described. The searching worker's opportunities are determined by the market parameter which is the probability that an application will not generate a job offer. The model is closed by determining the value of the market parameter given the search strategy that each worker individually follows. There exists a non-trivial eqUilibrium in steady state. At this equilibrium a social planner can improve each worker's welfare by inducing each worker to search less intensively.
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Diamond, Peter A, 1981.
"Mobility Costs, Frictional Unemployment, and Efficiency,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(4), pages 798-812, August.
- P. Diamond, 1980. "Mobility Costs, Frictional Unemployment and Efficiency," Working papers 257, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- John M. Barron & Otis W. Gilley, 1979. "The Effect of Unemployment Insurance on the Search Process," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 32(3), pages 363-366, April.
- Wilde, Louis L., 1977. "Labor market equilibrium under nonsequential search," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 373-393, December.
- Peter A. Diamond, 1982. "Wage Determination and Efficiency in Search Equilibrium," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 49(2), pages 217-227.
- Christopher A. Pissarides, 1985. "Taxes, Subsidies and Equilibrium Unemployment," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 52(1), pages 121-133. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:vir:virpap:398. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Debby Stanford)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.