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Endogenous Market Structures and Welfare

Author

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  • Federico Etro

    (Department of Economics, University Of Venice C� Foscari)

Abstract

I characterize microfounded endogenous market structures with Bertrand and Cournot competition and perform welfare analysis generalizing the Mankiw-Whinston condition for excess entry. The impact of market leaders on welfare is reconsidered, with a number of policy implications about strategic investments, vertical contracts, bundling, mergers and more. The neutrality of consumer surplus holds only when utility is homothetic. Under quantity competition, aggressive (accommodating) leaders increase consumer surplus if the elasticity of utility is decreasing (increasing) in consumption. This provides general rules to evaluate mergers and abuse of dominance issues in antitrust policy.

Suggested Citation

  • Federico Etro, 2012. "Endogenous Market Structures and Welfare," Working Papers 2012_12, Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari".
    • Handle: RePEc:ven:wpaper:2012_12
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Savagar, Anthony & Dixon, Huw, 2020. "Firm entry, excess capacity and endogenous productivity," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 121(C).
    2. Federico Etro, 2010. "Endogenous market structures and the optimal financial structure," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 43(4), pages 1333-1352, November.
    3. Maurizio Iacopetta & Raoul Minetti & Pietro F Peretto, 2019. "Financial Markets, Industry Dynamics and Growth," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 129(621), pages 2192-2215.
    4. Savagar, Anthony, 2021. "Measured productivity with endogenous markups and economic profits," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 133(C).
    5. Etro, Federico, 2011. "Endogenous market structures and contract theory: Delegation, principal-agent contracts, screening, franchising and tying," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 55(4), pages 463-479, May.
    6. Marta Aloi & Huw Dixon & Anthony Savagar, 2021. "Labor Responses, Regulation, and Business Churn," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 53(1), pages 119-156, February.
    7. Aggey Semenov & Julian Wright, 2011. "Entry deterrrence via renegotiation-proof non-exclusive contracts," Working Papers 1105E, University of Ottawa, Department of Economics.
    8. Federico Etro & Michela Cella, 2013. "Equilibrium Principal‐Agent Contracts: Competition and R&D Incentives," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 22(3), pages 488-512, September.
    9. Etro, Federico & Rossi, Lorenza, 2015. "Optimal monetary policy under Calvo pricing with Bertrand competition," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 423-440.
    10. Colciago, Andrea & Etro, Federico, 2010. "Real business cycles with Cournot competition and endogenous entry," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 32(4), pages 1101-1117, December.
    11. Marta Aloi & Joanna Poyago-Theotoky & Frederic Tournemaine, 2018. "Growth and the Geography of Knowledge," CESifo Working Paper Series 6951, CESifo.
    12. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/5gcvpatejr92bbog69gpen3cmn is not listed on IDEAS
    13. Chu, Angus C. & Ji, Lei, 2016. "Monetary Policy And Endogenous Market Structure In A Schumpeterian Economy," Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 20(5), pages 1127-1145, July.
    14. Colin Davis & Ken-Ichi Hashimoto, 2015. "Industry Concentration, Knowledge Diffusion and Economic Growth Without Scale Effects," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 82(328), pages 769-789, October.
    15. Alexandros P. Bechlioulis & Sophocles N. Brissimis, 2020. "Consumer default and optimal consumption decisions," Journal of Economic Studies, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 48(5), pages 1020-1034, September.
    16. Chu, Angus C. & Furukawa, Yuichi, 2012. "Patents versus R&D subsidies in a Schumpeterian growth model with endogenous market structure," MPRA Paper 40469, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    17. Angus C. Chu & Yuichi Furukawa & Lei Ji, 2016. "Patents, R&D subsidies, and endogenous market structure in a schumpeterian economy," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 82(3), pages 809-825, January.
    18. Etro, Federico & Rossi, Lorenza, 2015. "New-Keynesian Phillips curve with Bertrand competition and endogenous entry," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 318-340.
    19. Colin Davis & Ken‐ichi Hashimoto, 2018. "Corporate Tax Policy And Industry Location With Fully Endogenous Productivity Growth," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 56(2), pages 1136-1148, April.
    20. Varvarigos, Dimitrios & Gil-Moltó, Maria José, 2016. "Endogenous Market Structure, Occupational Choice, And Growth Cycles," Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 20(1), pages 70-94, January.
    21. Federico Etro, 2014. "Some thoughts on the Sutton approach," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 112(2), pages 99-113, June.
    22. Etro, Federico, 2016. "Endogenous market structures in the credit market and Ricardian equivalence," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 140(C), pages 14-18.
    23. R. Cellini & L. Lambertini & G. I. P. Ottaviano, 2015. "To Know or Not To Know: Strategic Inattention and Endogenous Market Structure," Working Papers wp987, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Endogenous entry; oligopoly; welfare;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance

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