IDEAS home Printed from
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this paper

Fight Fire with Fire: A Model of Pollution and Growth with Cooperative Settlement

  • Chia-Ying Chang

    (Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University)

  • Chien-Chieh Huang

    (Department of Economics, National Dong-Hwa University, Taiwan)

  • Ping Wang


    (Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University)

This paper establishes a growth model where firms and residents in polluted areas bargain cooperatively to settle environmental concerns. While economic development affects the extent of the negotiation outcomes, the bargaining results also influence firms' incentive to undertake R&D and thus economic growth. Due to the opposing effects of production and matching technologies, an inverted-U relationship between pollution and growth is obtained. Contrasting to growth-promoting policies, policies that create barriers to firm entry or matching may reduce pollution harming growth. Due to the opposing effects of thick-matching versus effective-discounting and pollution-externality, the decentralized outcome may involve over or under-pollution.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL:
File Function: First version, 2000
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by Vanderbilt University Department of Economics in its series Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers with number 0010.

in new window

Date of creation: Apr 2000
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:van:wpaper:0010
Contact details of provider: Web page:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Farzin, Y. H., 1996. "Optimal pricing of environmental and natural resource use with stock externalities," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(1-2), pages 31-57, October.
  2. Peter A. Diamond, 1982. "Wage Determination and Efficiency in Search Equilibrium," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 49(2), pages 217-227.
  3. Ariel Rubinstein, 2010. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Levine's Working Paper Archive 252, David K. Levine.
  4. Stokey, Nancy L, 1998. "Are There Limits to Growth?," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 39(1), pages 1-31, February.
  5. Mortensen, Dale T, 1982. "Property Rights and Efficiency in Mating, Racing, and Related Games," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(5), pages 968-79, December.
  6. John, A. & Pecchenino, R. & Schimmelpfennig, D. & Schreft, S., 1995. "Short-lived agents and the long-lived environment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 127-141, September.
  7. Laing, D. & Palivos, T. & Wang, P., 1995. "Vertical Innovation, Product Cycles and Endogenous Growth in Search Equilibrium," Papers 01-95-02, Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics.
  8. Shibata, Hirofumi, 1971. "A Bargaining Model of the Pure Theory of Public Expenditure," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 79(1), pages 1-29, Jan.-Feb..
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:van:wpaper:0010. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (John P. Conley)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.