Communication Networks in the N-Player Electronic Mail Game
This paper shows that Rubinsteinâ€™s results on the two-player electronic mail game do not extend to the N-player electronic mail game.
|Date of creation:||Mar 2007|
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- Morris Stephen E, 2002. "Faulty Communication: Some Variations on the Electronic Mail Game," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 1(1), pages 1-26, January.
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