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Communication Networks in the N-Player Electronic Mail Game

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  • K. de Jaegher

Abstract

This paper shows that Rubinstein’s results on the two-player electronic mail game do not extend to the N-player electronic mail game.

Suggested Citation

  • K. de Jaegher, 2007. "Communication Networks in the N-Player Electronic Mail Game," Working Papers 07-10, Utrecht School of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:use:tkiwps:0710
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    File URL: https://dspace.library.uu.nl/bitstream/handle/1874/309927/07_10.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Sebastian Morris, 2022. "Introduction," India Studies in Business and Economics, in: Macroeconomic Policy in India Since the Global Financial Crisis, chapter 0, pages 1-21, Springer.
    2. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1989. "The Electronic Mail Game: Strategic Behavior under "Almost Common Knowledge."," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(3), pages 385-391, June.
    3. Morris Stephen E, 2002. "Faulty Communication: Some Variations on the Electronic Mail Game," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 1(1), pages 1-26, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Communication Networks; N-Player Electronic Mail Game;

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