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The new stage of the states concept evolution: example of Russia

Author

Listed:
  • Alexander Rakviashvili

    (Department of Economics, Lomonosov Moscow State University)

Abstract

The article is dedicated to the state's concept evolution. Here is the author's vision of the state as an abstract notion that describes specific governmental relations, formatted in a result of a long evolution process. The special attention is attracted to the Russian political system and features of the new stage of the state's evolution.

Suggested Citation

  • Alexander Rakviashvili, 2013. "The new stage of the states concept evolution: example of Russia," Working Papers 0005, Moscow State University, Faculty of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:upa:wpaper:0005
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.econ.msu.ru/ext/lib/Category/x1a/xae/6830/file/0005.pdf
    File Function: First version, 2013
    Download Restriction: no
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Martin C. McGuire & Mancur Olson, 1998. "The Economics of Autocracy and Majority Rule: The Invisible Hand and the Use of Force," International Economic Association Series, in: Silvio Borner & Martin Paldam (ed.), The Political Dimension of Economic Growth, chapter 3, pages 38-73, Palgrave Macmillan.
    2. Sylvain Marsat & Yves Mard, 2007. "« Rôle de l'influence sociale sur l'interprétation de l'information comptable : une expérimentation »," Post-Print halshs-00543065, HAL.
    3. repec:ces:ifodic:v:7:y:2009:i:3:p:14567076 is not listed on IDEAS
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    State; autocracy; democracy; morality.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • A10 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - General
    • P51 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Comparative Economic Systems - - - Comparative Analysis of Economic Systems
    • P00 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - General - - - General

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