IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/unu/wpaper/wp-2020-147.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Political connections and firm's formalization: Evidence from Viet Nam

Author

Listed:
  • Duc Anh Dang
  • Hai Anh La

Abstract

The literature shows that political connections have different effects on firms' activities. However, the question of how political connections affect firms' formalization has not been explored. Using data from three waves of the Vietnam Small and Medium Enterprise Survey for the period from 2007 to 2011, this paper aims to examine the relationship between political connections and firms' formalization in Viet Nam. We find that firms with political connections increase their share of formal workers.

Suggested Citation

  • Duc Anh Dang & Hai Anh La, 2020. "Political connections and firm's formalization: Evidence from Viet Nam," WIDER Working Paper Series wp-2020-147, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    • Handle: RePEc:unu:wpaper:wp-2020-147
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.wider.unu.edu/sites/default/files/Publications/Working-paper/PDF/wp2020-147.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Agrawal, Anup & Knoeber, Charles R, 2001. "Do Some Outside Directors Play a Political Role?," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 44(1), pages 179-198, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Abdelrhman Yusuf & Mohamed Sherif, 2020. "All on Board? New Evidence on Board Characteristics from a Large Panel of UK FTSE Indices," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 12(13), pages 1-26, July.
    2. Jun†Koo Kang & Le Zhang, 2018. "Do Outside Directors with Government Experience Create Value?," Financial Management, Financial Management Association International, vol. 47(2), pages 209-251, June.
    3. Tang, Xuesong & Lin, Yan & Peng, Qing & Du, Jun & Chan, Kam C., 2016. "Politically connected directors and firm value: Evidence from forced resignations in China," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 148-167.
    4. Liu, Li & Liu, Qigui & Tian, Gary & Wang, Peipei, 2018. "Government connections and the persistence of profitability: Evidence from Chinese listed firms," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 110-129.
    5. Zhang, Bobo & Zhang, Zhou, 2022. "Shining light on corporate political spending: Evidence from shareholder engagements," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(C).
    6. Alexandra Niessen & Stefan Ruenzi, 2010. "Political Connectedness and Firm Performance: Evidence from Germany," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 11(4), pages 441-464, November.
    7. Su, Zhong-qin & Xiao, Zuoping & Yu, Lin, 2019. "Do political connections enhance or impede corporate innovation?," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 94-110.
    8. Jianghua Zhou & Rui Wu & Jizhen Li, 2019. "More ties the merrier? Different social ties and firm innovation performance," Asia Pacific Journal of Management, Springer, vol. 36(2), pages 445-471, June.
    9. Peter J Baldacchino & Jean Paul Abela & Norbert Tabone & Simon Grima, 2021. "Board of Director Diversity and Its Corporate Governance Implications in Maltese Equity-Listed Companies," International Journal of Finance, Insurance and Risk Management, International Journal of Finance, Insurance and Risk Management, vol. 11(4), pages 37-65.
    10. Cheng, Louis T.W. & Leung, T.Y., 2016. "Government protection, political connection and management turnover in China," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 160-176.
    11. Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, 2003. "Boards of directors as an endogenously determined institution: a survey of the economic literature," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, vol. 9(Apr), pages 7-26.
    12. repec:tur:wpaper:9 is not listed on IDEAS
    13. Zengji Song & Abraham Nahm & Zongyi Zhang, 2015. "The value of partial state ownership in publicly listed private sector enterprises: evidence from China," Post-Communist Economies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 27(3), pages 336-353, September.
    14. John R. Graham & Sonali Hazarika & Krishnamoorthy Narasimhan, 2011. "Corporate Governance, Debt, and Investment Policy During the Great Depression," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 57(12), pages 2083-2100, December.
    15. Sofia Larmou & Nikos Vafeas, 2010. "The relation between board size and firm performance in firms with a history of poor operating performance," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 14(1), pages 61-85, February.
    16. Cole, Rebel & Johan, Sofia & Schweizer, Denis, 2021. "Corporate failures: Declines, collapses, and scandals," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 67(C).
    17. Renee B. Adams & Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, 2010. "The Role of Boards of Directors in Corporate Governance: A Conceptual Framework and Survey," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 48(1), pages 58-107, March.
    18. Volonté, Christophe, 2015. "Boards: Independent and committed directors?," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 25-37.
    19. Yuxuan Li & Xin Miao & Dequan Zheng & Yanhong Tang, 2019. "Corporate Public Transparency on Financial Performance: The Moderating Role of Political Embeddedness," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 11(19), pages 1-17, October.
    20. Chune Young Chung & Jung Hoon Byun & Jason Young, 2019. "Corporate Political Ties and Firm Value: Comparative Analysis in the Korean Market," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 11(2), pages 1-25, January.
    21. Hadani, Michael & Doh, Jonathan P. & Schneider, Marguerite, 2019. "Social movements and corporate political activity: Managerial responses to socially oriented shareholder activism," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 156-170.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Political connections; Formalization; Viet Nam;
    All these keywords.

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:unu:wpaper:wp-2020-147. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Siméon Rapin (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/widerfi.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.