Is there a distinction between morality and convention?
In Humean analyses of the emergence and stability of moral rules, ideas of justice and reciprocity originate in non-moral, conventional solutions to conflicts of interest in human interaction. This theory seems contrary to an empirical claim made by some developmental psychologists: that, from early childhood, human beings perceive a distinction between (universal) â€˜moral' and (relative) â€˜conventional' rules, and that moral rules apply to matters of welfare, fairness and trust. I review the psychological literature and argue that, properly understood, it is compatible with a Humean analysis of morality.
|Date of creation:||12 May 2008|
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