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Culling the quangos: when is delegation revoked

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  • Stephen Greasley

    (Centre for Competition Policy and School of Political, Social and International Studies, University of East Anglia)

  • Chris Hanretty

    (Centre for Competition Policy and School of Political, Social and International Studies University of East Anglia)

Abstract

We investigate the lifespan and risk of termination of 790 arm’s length agencies in the United Kingdom over the period 1985 - 2008. We hypothesise that the risk of termination will depend on three groups of factors: factors relating to the rationales for the initial delegation of power to the arm’s length agency and the form of delegation; factors relating to the policy position of the government; and factors relating to the economy. We find that agencies which have a regulatory function (particularly an economic regulation function), and those designed to ensure probity of decision-making are less likely to be terminated in any given year. Agencies structured as executive non-departmental public bodies and non-ministerial departments are also longer-lived than others. Agencies operating under right-wing governments and under heavily indebted governments are more likely to be terminated, although left-wing governments are more sensitive to the effects of debt.

Suggested Citation

  • Stephen Greasley & Chris Hanretty, 2012. "Culling the quangos: when is delegation revoked," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Competition Policy (CCP) 2012-12, Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
    • Handle: RePEc:uea:ueaccp:2012_12
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    References listed on IDEAS

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