Revisiting the Antisocial Punishment across Societies Experiment
This paper presents an alternative interpretation of an experimental public goods game dataset, particularly on the understanding of the observed antisocial behaviour phenomenon between subjects around the world. The anonymous nature of contributions and punishments are taken into account to reinterpret the experimental results by analysing dynamic behaviour in terms of mean contributions across societies and their association with antisocial punishment. Thus, by also taking into account the heterogeneity between the experimented cities, the analysis contrasts with the interpretation of one trend across cities, as the findings indicate two opposite trends in differentgroups of cities.
|Date of creation:||15 May 2013|
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- Urs Fischbacher, 2007. "z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 171-178, June.
- Peter C. B. Phillips & Donggyu Sul, 2007.
"Transition Modeling and Econometric Convergence Tests,"
Econometric Society, vol. 75(6), pages 1771-1855, November.
- Peter C.B. Phillips & Donggyu Sul, 2007. "Transition Modeling and Econometric Convergence Tests," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1595, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
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