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Cooperative Investments Induced by Contract Law

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  • Schweizer, Urs

Abstract

Lecture on the first SFB/TR 15 meeting, Gummersbach, July, 18 - 20, 2004This paper revisits the economic analysis of contract law for a setting of cooperative investments. While Che and Chung (1999) have shown that expectation damages perform rather poorly, the present paper argues that this negative result follows from their impicit assumption of unilateral expectation damages. Yet, the very nature of cooperative investments gives rise to the possibility that both parties may claim expectation damages. It is shown that such a regime of bilateral expectation damages provides the incentives for the first best solution even in a framework of binary choice where, for selfish investments, the traditional overreliance result would hold.

Suggested Citation

  • Schweizer, Urs, 2004. "Cooperative Investments Induced by Contract Law," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 10, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
  • Handle: RePEc:trf:wpaper:10
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    File URL: https://epub.ub.uni-muenchen.de/13536/1/10.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Motty Perry & Daniel R. Vincent, 2002. "The Optimal Timing of Procurement Decisions and Patent Allocations," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 43(4), pages 1035-1052, November.
    2. William P. Rogerson, 1984. "Efficient Reliance and Damage Measures for Breach of Contract," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, pages 39-53.
    3. Yeon-Koo Che & Tai-Yeong Chung, 1999. "Contract Damages and Cooperative Investments," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, pages 84-105.
    4. Steven Shavell, 1980. "Damage Measures for Breach of Contract," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 11(2), pages 466-490, Autumn.
    5. Edlin, Aaron S & Reichelstein, Stefan, 1996. "Holdups, Standard Breach Remedies, and Optimal Investment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 478-501.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • K12 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Contract Law
    • D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities

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