Comment: Identification of a Simple Dynamic Discrete Game under Rationalizability
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References listed on IDEAS
- Elie Tamer, 2003. "Incomplete Simultaneous Discrete Response Model with Multiple Equilibria," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 70(1), pages 147-165.
- Philip A. Haile & Elie Tamer, 2003.
"Inference with an Incomplete Model of English Auctions,"
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- Philip Haile, 2000. "Inference with an Incomplete Model of English Auctions," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1546, Econometric Society.
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- Aradillas-Lopez, Andres & Tamer, Elie, 2008. "The Identification Power of Equilibrium in Simple Games," Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, American Statistical Association, vol. 26, pages 261-310.
- Robert Aumann & Adam Brandenburger, 2014. "Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium," World Scientific Book Chapters,in: The Language of Game Theory Putting Epistemics into the Mathematics of Games, chapter 5, pages 113-136 World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
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- Victor Aguirregabiria & Gustavo Vicentini, 2006.
"Dynamic Spatial Competition Between Multi-Store Firms,"
tecipa-253, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
- Aguirregabiria, Victor & Vicentini, Gustavo, 2014. "Dynamic Spatial Competition Between Multi-Store Firms," CEPR Discussion Papers 10273, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Victor Aguirregabiria & Gustavo Vicentini, 2012. "Dynamic Spatial Competition Between Multi-Store Firms," Working Papers tecipa-457, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
- repec:bla:jindec:v:64:y:2016:i:4:p:710-754 is not listed on IDEAS
More about this item
KeywordsIdentification; Empirical dynamic discrete games; Rational behavior; Rationalizability.;
- C50 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric Modeling - - - General
- C51 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric Modeling - - - Model Construction and Estimation
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-GTH-2007-10-06 (Game Theory)
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